Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3676

Also known as: CVE-2026-70667, GHSA-f3qq-49m6-rw8f

Summary

Lemur: SSRF protection in certificate revocation checking bypassable via HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding (incomplete fix for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95)

Details

Summary
The SSRF mitigation added for GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95 (_validate_revocation_url() in `lemur
/certificates/verify.py`) can be bypassed. An operator-role user who uploads a certificate with attacker-controlled CRL/OCSP extensions can still make Lemur reach internal destinations (RFC1918, loopback, link-local 169.254.169.254) during verification.

Affected version
Tested against main (the commit that introduced _validate_revocation_url). The 1.9.2 release predates that guard and is vulnerable to the original SSRF (GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95) directly; this bypass applies to the unreleased mitigation in main. Please map the affected range to whichever release will first contain _validate_revocation_url.

Bypass 1 — HTTP redirect (deterministic)
The guard validates only the URL in the certificate; the CRL fetch then follows redirects without re-validating the target:

# lemur/certificates/verify.py:174
response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6))   

The attacker hosts the CRL URL on a public host they control (passes the guard); that host returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/.... requests follows it to the internal target the guard never inspected.

Bypass 2 — DNS rebinding / TOCTOU (probabilistic)
The guard resolves once during validation; the fetch re-resolves independently:

# lemur/certificates/verify.py:51
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(hostname))

A low-TTL attacker name that answers a public IP at check time and an internal IP at fetch time passes the guard but is fetched internally. Same gap affects the OCSP path (openssl ocsp -url <url>, verify.py:90-99).

Relationship to GHSA-54vg-pfh7-jq95
Incomplete-fix of that mitigation, not a duplicate. Bypass 1 is not mentioned there; bypass 2 is the rebinding gap that advisory's remediation text anticipated ("pins the resolved IP") but the code does not implement.

Affected endpoint
POST /api/1/certificates/upload (operator role) → verify_string → crl_verify / ocsp_verify. Triggered when verification runs (e.g. the check_revocation task).

PoC

  1. Generate a cert with crlDistributionPoints = URI:http://attacker.example/crl.
  2. That host returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/... (bypass 1), or use a low-TTL rebinding name (bypass 2).
  3. Upload via POST /api/1/certificates/upload as an operator user.
  4. Trigger lemur certificate check_revocation.
  5. Observe the request reach the internal address (tcpdump -nni any host 169.254.169.254).

<img width="1140" height="277" alt="poc-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f27b9584-b33a-4b9c-b812-8c60302e1892" />

Impact
Blind SSRF from the Lemur host: reach internal services and instance metadata (169.254.169.254 without IMDSv2). Response is parsed as a CRL and discarded — reachability/side-effects, not response exfiltration.

Remediation

  • allow_redirects=False on CRL fetches (or re-validate every redirect hop).
  • Resolve once, pin the IP, connect to the pinned address; route the OCSP URL through the same check.
  • Reject names with any internal A/AAAA record.

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Dates

Published
2026-08-19 11:56 UTC
Modified
2026-08-19 12:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

lemur

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.9.3 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.9.3

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.9.3
    pip install --upgrade lemur==1.9.3

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences