nltk
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.10.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.10.3
Fix
- Fixed version
3.10.3pip install --upgrade nltk==3.10.3
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-78680, GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm
NLTK: Uncontrolled search path when invoking the Graphviz 'dot' binary
Two NLTK sites executed the Graphviz dot program by bare name, so process creation resolved it via the search path — and on Windows via the current working directory — rather than a validated absolute location. An attacker who can place a file named dot where resolution looks (the CWD on Windows, or a writable/relative entry such as . on PATH) has their binary executed in place of Graphviz (arbitrary code execution).
Affected (<= 3.10.2):
nltk.parse.dependencygraph.dot2img — called find_binary("dot") but discarded the returned validated path and then ran the bare name ["dot", ...], so the validation had no effect.nltk.translate.api.AlignedSent._repr_svg_ — ran the bare name with no validation at all (IPython SVG rendering).This is the same class already fixed for the senna, weka, boxer, malt, repp and hunpos wrappers. nltk.internals.find_binary refuses a CWD-relative match for a bare tool name and returns only a trusted absolute path; the fix runs that path in both sites.
---
Attack demonstration
Captured output, not illustrative. A ./dot that writes a PWNED marker, planted in the CWD with . prepended to PATH.
The vulnerable behaviour (old bare-name exec):
Control (OLD behavior) — bare ['dot'] in this dir with '.' on PATH:
bare ['dot'] executed planted binary = True
The patched functions refuse it:
FIXED code, with ./dot planted and '.' on PATH:
dependencygraph.dot2img : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
AlignedSent._repr_svg_ : Exception "Cannot find the dot binary..." | planted-binary-executed=False safe
And `find_binary` itself was attacked directly (the fix trusts nothing else):
Attack 1: ./dot in CWD, no dot on PATH -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 2: ./dot/dot (dir 'dot' holding 'dot') -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 3: '.' on PATH + ./dot -> LookupError (refused) safe
Attack 4: attacker-writable ABSOLUTE dir on PATH -> returned /…/evilbin/dot (absolute)
Attack 4 is out of scope: trusting an absolute directory that is already on PATH is the operating system's own trust model — an attacker who can write to a PATH directory owns the account regardless of NLTK. find_binary defends specifically against the CWD/relative injection that bare-name exec is vulnerable to (attacks 1–3), which is exactly what this fix inherits.
Environment: python 3.13.7. dot is not required to reproduce — the planted binary is the payload.
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 3.10.3 (ecosystem)3.10.3
3.10.3pip install --upgrade nltk==3.10.3Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0