nltk
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.10.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.10.3
Fix
- Fixed version
3.10.3pip install --upgrade nltk==3.10.3
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-81723, GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7
NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()
Summary
XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment() reads a corpus file in 1 KiB blocks, appending
each block to a growing fragment string, then calls _VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment)
on the full accumulated buffer every iteration. Because each iteration rescans the
entire accumulated fragment, the total amount of work grows quadratically with input
size.
Commit c9c332284 (CWE-1333) made each match() call linear. The quadratic behavior
is separate: the loop calls match() once per 1 KiB block, each time on a longer
buffer.
On the test system, an 8 MiB malformed XML file consumed approximately 48 CPU-seconds
through the public BNCCorpusReader.words() API with no source modification. Absolute
timings vary by hardware. _read_xml_fragment() imposes no limit on fragment size or
iteration count.
Details
File: nltk/corpus/reader/xmldocs.py
Function: XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment(), lines 261–308
The relevant loop:
fragment = ""
while True:
fragment += stream.read(self._BLOCK_SIZE) # grows by 1 KiB per iteration
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment): # rescans full buffer each time
return fragment
...
last_open_bracket = fragment.rfind("<")
if last_open_bracket > 0: # False for single-'<' payload
if self._VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment[:last_open_bracket]):
return ...
# loop continues
For a payload of b'<' + b'a' * (N-1):
_VALID_XML_RE.match(fragment) does not succeed because the unterminated tag prevents the expression from matching before EOF.fragment.rfind("<") returns 0; the guard last_open_bracket > 0 is False, so the backtrack branch is never taken.Affected readers -> readers that rely on XMLCorpusView, includingBNCCorpusReader, NPSChatCorpusReader, SemcorCorpusReader, MTECorpusReader,NKJPCorpusReader, FrameNetCorpusReader, VerbNetCorpusReader, and directXMLCorpusView instantiation. XMLCorpusReader.xml() is not affected -> it callsdefusedxml.safe_parse().
PoC
Requires only pip install nltk. No corpus data needed.
from pathlib import Path
from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory
from time import perf_counter
from nltk.corpus.reader.bnc import BNCCorpusReader
SIZES_KIB = (256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192)
results = []
with TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
root = Path(directory)
malformed = root / "unterminated.xml"
for kib in SIZES_KIB:
malformed.write_bytes(b"<" + b"a" * (kib * 1024 - 1))
t = perf_counter()
try:
list(BNCCorpusReader(str(root), [malformed.name]).words())
except ValueError as e:
assert "tag not closed" in str(e)
results.append(perf_counter() - t)
print("KiB seconds growth")
for i, (kib, elapsed) in enumerate(zip(SIZES_KIB, results)):
ratio = "-" if i == 0 else f"{elapsed / results[i-1]:.2f}x"
print(f"{kib:5d} {elapsed:9.3f} {ratio}")
Runtime should increase by approximately fourfold for each doubling of input size,
although absolute timings vary by hardware.
During verification, _VALID_XML_RE.match() was instrumented to record the size of
each input. For a 256 KiB malformed file it was invoked 257 times on monotonically
increasing buffers (1024, 2048, …, 262144 bytes), with the final call occurring after
EOF. This confirms that every iteration rescans the accumulated fragment.
Impact
Applications that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files through an affected reader
are vulnerable. The attacker needs only write access to a path the reader will open. No
NLTK credentials or special privileges required. Offline tools reading only trusted
local corpora are not at risk.
Affected versions: Verified in NLTK 3.9.4, 3.10.0, and the current develop branch.
Historical inspection indicates the same loop structure has existed since the
introduction of XMLCorpusView (2007), but only the listed versions were
experimentally verified. No patch exists in any published release.
This issue results in CPU exhaustion and may allow denial of service in applications
that process attacker-controlled XML corpus files.
Suggested Fix
Avoid rescanning the accumulated fragment from the beginning after each 1 KiB read.
Incremental parsing, bounded fragment accumulation, or another streaming approach would
eliminate the quadratic behavior while preserving existing semantics.
A regression test should verify that BNCCorpusReader.words() raises ValueError
within a fixed timeout (e.g. 5 seconds) against a 2 MiB malformed input. The existingtest_xmldocs_security.py covers only the prior ReDoS payloads and does not exercise
this path.
Low Basis: CVSS v3 score 3.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
0, fixed 3.10.3 (ecosystem)3.10.3
3.10.3pip install --upgrade nltk==3.10.3Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0