Details
Impact
- Execution / cost: unauthenticated callers run arbitrary prompts against the operator's configured LLM credentials, and can queue long-running jobs (up to
timeout, default 3600s) consuming CPU, memory, queue slots, and provider billing. - Confidentiality: callers list all jobs (
GET /api/v1/runs) and read completed results from the shared store — other callers' agent outputs. - Integrity / control: callers cancel running jobs and delete terminal jobs.
The realistic worst case is a reachable jobs endpoint used to run unauthorized prompts on the operator's LLM account, then enumerate and exfiltrate other jobs' outputs.
Suggested Mitigation
Mirror the fix already applied to the legacy Flask server (CVE-2026-44338), but for the jobs router:
- Add a jobs-server auth token (e.g.
PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN) and require it on every/api/v1/runsroute via a router-level dependency, so future routes inherit protection by default. - Use constant-time comparison (
hmac.compare_digest/secrets.compare_digest). - Add per-job ownership / scoped job tokens so one caller cannot list, read, cancel, or delete another caller's jobs.
- Keep
127.0.0.1as default; warn or refuse when binding a public interface without auth configured. - Regression tests asserting unauthenticated
POST/GET/cancel/deletereturn401when auth is enabled.
import hmac, os
from fastapi import Depends, Header, HTTPException
def verify_jobs_token(authorization: str | None = Header(None),
x_api_key: str | None = Header(None, alias="X-API-Key")):
expected = os.getenv("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_TOKEN")
if not expected:
raise HTTPException(401, "Jobs API auth is not configured")
token = x_api_key
if authorization and authorization.startswith("Bearer "):
token = authorization[7:]
if not token or not hmac.compare_digest(token, expected):
raise HTTPException(401, "Unauthorized")
# create_router(...) -> APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/runs", dependencies=[Depends(verify_jobs_token)])