praisonai
Affected
- introduced
3.9.26, fixed4.6.58(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.58
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.58
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55522, GHSA-hxmv-c4g6-5fqc, PYSEC-2026-3903
PraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
Summary
PraisonAI's workflow include implementation implicitly imports and executes an included recipe's tools.py file even when the documented tools.py autoload opt-in is unset.
This bypasses the hardening added for the prior automatic tools.py RCE advisory family. A workflow that includes an untrusted local recipe can execute arbitrary Python module-level code before any model call or child workflow execution.
The same sink is reachable through the higher-level praisonai.recipe.run() recipe API when a steps-based recipe workflow includes a local child recipe. The supplementary PoV demonstrates this route without starting a network service or relying on external APIs.
This is distinct from the previously published tool_resolver.py, api/call.py, templates/tool_override.py, and agents_generator.py variants. The affected callsite is the workflow include implementation in praisonaiagents, reached through the documented/covered Include workflow composition feature.
Affected Components
praisonaiagentspraisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.pyWorkflow._execute_include()tools_py = recipe_path / "tools.py"
if tools_py.exists():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("recipe_tools", tools_py)
recipe_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(recipe_module)
The current head also contains a similar unguarded workflow-local tools.py import in _resolve_pydantic_class(). That adjacent sink is not needed for the primary impact claim because the include path has a cleaner public workflow execution path and local PoV.
Security Boundary
PraisonAI documents secure defaults for implicit tools.py autoload:
PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS controls implicit template/CWD tools.py autoload and is disabled by default.PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS controls automatic loading of local tools.py files and requires the value true.GHSA-xcmw-grxf-wjhj assert that template/CWD tools.py must not execute by default.Workflow._execute_include() does not check PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS, does not check PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS, and does not route through the shared safe loader before executing the included recipe's tools.py.
The report is not claiming that workflow includes themselves are unintended. Local tests in the repository cover Include, include(), YAML include parsing, and include-in-loop behavior. The security issue is specifically that the include implementation executes the included recipe's tools.py unconditionally instead of respecting the same implicit-tool-loading gates used elsewhere.
The report also is not claiming that recipe tools.py files are inherently unsafe or unsupported. Official recipe documentation describes tools.py as the place for custom functions and dynamic variables. The issue is the implicit execution mode: official tool-override documentation says implicit tools.py autoload from CWD or template directories is disabled by default, with explicit override files/directories recommended for new projects.
Impact
An attacker who can cause a victim process to run a workflow that includes an attacker-controlled local recipe directory can execute arbitrary Python code as the PraisonAI process user.
The payload runs during include setup, before child workflow parsing or any LLM/model call. The PoV only writes a local marker file.
Reproduction
Run the attached local-only PoV:
python3 pov.py
Expected vulnerable output:
VULNERABLE: included recipe tools.py executed with PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset
marker=...
marker_content=executed
The PoV:
PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS.child_recipe/tools.py with a marker-write payload.child_recipe/workflow.yaml.Workflow(steps=[include("child_recipe")]).run(...).Supplementary higher-level API check:
python3 pov_recipe_run.py
Expected vulnerable output:
VULNERABLE: praisonai.recipe.run() reached workflow include tools.py execution with PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS and PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS unset
recipe_status=success
recipe_ok=True
marker=...
marker_content=executed
Validation
Tested vulnerable:
bcb6957dac1bc8949866522948a9f61d7e4bd4c1v4.6.56 (praisonai==4.6.56, praisonaiagents==1.6.56)v3.9.26 (praisonai==3.9.26, praisonaiagents==0.12.12)Negative/control observations:
v3.9.24 does not expose the same include helper/API used by this PoV.praisonai.templates.tool_override.create_tool_registry_with_overrides(..., template_dir=...) path does not execute tools.py when PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS is unset.src/praisonai/tests/unit/templates/test_tool_override_autoload_gate.py states that implicit recipe/template tools.py autoload should be gated behind PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS.include() imports, YAML include parsing, direct Workflow._execute_include presence, and include steps inside loops.praisonai.recipe.run() also reaches the sink through steps-based recipe workflow execution. This strengthens API reachability but does not change the base severity claim to Critical because a clean unauthenticated remote route for this exact include sink was not validated.Root Cause
The include implementation reintroduced a direct importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() plus spec.loader.exec_module() path outside the centralized safe loader and template override gate. Prior fixes hardened several tools.py autoload chokepoints, but this workflow include sibling callsite still executes module-level code unconditionally.
Suggested Fix
Route included-recipe tool loading through the same security policy used by the template tool override system.
Conservative options:
tools.py by default.PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS is explicitly truthy.tools_sources, override_files, or a caller-supplied registry for custom tools.Workflow(steps=[include("...")]) proving included recipe tools.py does not execute with the opt-in unset.If local workflow includes are intended to use PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS instead, the same principle applies: the include sink should call a shared helper and should not perform raw exec_module() directly.
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
3.9.26, fixed 4.6.58 (ecosystem)4.6.58
4.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.58Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0