praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.58(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.58
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.58
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55528, GHSA-7g3p-92qq-8wvh
praisonaiagents: AgentServer declares auth_token but never enforces it on any route
Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research
Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
---
Package: praisonaiagents on PyPI
Affected version (empirically tested): 1.6.48
Component: praisonaiagents.server.AgentServer (the bundled HTTP / SSE server)
---
TL;DR
AgentServer.ServerConfig advertises an auth_token: Optional[str] = None field that operators set when they want to lock down the server. The GET /info endpoint even displays it back as "auth_token": "***" — strongly implying the value is wired into request authentication.
It isn't. AgentServer._create_app never reads auth_token, never adds an authentication middleware, and never decorates any route with a dependency that checks it. Every route — /info, /publish, /events, /health — accepts unauthenticated requests regardless of whether auth_token is configured.
The same package contains a *sibling* server, praisonaiagents.ui.a2a.A2A, written by the same developer, which implements the bearer-token pattern correctly via FastAPI's Depends(_verify_auth). This rules out the "auth is not yet implemented; operators are expected to add it" reading: the developer knew the pattern but did not apply it to AgentServer.
Root cause
Expected behavior when setting ServerConfig(auth_token="…"):
"Only requests with a matching Authorization header will be
accepted on /publish, /events, /info."
Actual behavior (server/server.py, dist 1.6.48):
- line 31 auth_token: Optional[str] = None # declared
- line 39 "auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None # displayed
- lines 122-204: no auth middleware, no Depends, no
request.headers["Authorization"] read,
no comparison to self.config.auth_token.
Impact:
The configuration knob is dead code from the route handlers'
perspective. All routes always run. The operator has no signal
that their auth_token was discarded — /info even confirms it
was received by displaying "***".
Sibling proof — the same package gets it right elsewhere
praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:
# line 163
async def _verify_auth(authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)):
"""Verify bearer token if auth_token is configured."""
if self.auth_token is None:
return
...
if len(parts) != 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer" \
or parts[1] != self.auth_token:
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, ...)
# line 192
from fastapi import Depends
_a2a_deps = [Depends(_verify_auth)] if self.auth_token else []
That is the missing implementation. Porting it to AgentServer — either via Starlette BaseHTTPMiddleware or by switching to FastAPI and adding Depends(_verify_auth) to each route — closes the gap.
Affected routes (empirically tested)
| Route | Method | Accepts unauth requests? | Impact |
|-------------|--------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| /info | GET | Yes (200) | Leaks server config; confirms auth_token is set ("***"); reveals client count and CORS config. |
| /publish | POST | Yes (200) | Anyone broadcasts arbitrary {type, data} to every subscribed agent. Event payload is whatever the attacker sends. |
| /events | GET | Yes (200) | Anyone subscribes to the SSE stream and observes every event published by the server (and by any other anonymous attacker). |
| /health | GET | Yes (200) | Leaks live SSE client count. |
Impact
The /publish and /events routes are the load-bearing ones. Together they let an unauthenticated network-adjacent attacker:
AgentServer.broadcast(event_type, data) puts the payload into every SSEClient.queue; any consumer dispatching on event_type will dispatch on the attacker-chosen type. Real deployments register handlers per event type via AgentServer.on_event(...); an attacker who can guess (or enumerate via /info + inspection) a registered type can drive arbitrary handler invocations with attacker-chosen data./events. Whatever the legitimate publishers send is visible: agent observations, intermediate plans, tool inputs and outputs, user-supplied prompts that the operator believed were behind the auth_token wall./info is sufficient to enumerate cors_origins (helping plan cross-origin attacks if any of the listed origins are attacker-controlled) and to confirm that the target has bothered to set auth_token, signalling a high-value target.SSEClient.queue is a queue.Queue with no documented size cap; the event broadcaster does not check max_connections against publishers, only subscribers. An attacker can also flood /publish to fill every subscriber's queue, denying service to legitimate broadcasts (CWE-770). Not scored as the main impact above.
Anchors
praisonaiagents 1.6.48, file praisonaiagents/server/server.py:
| Line | Symbol | What it shows |
|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 31 | auth_token: Optional[str] = None | Declared. |
| 39 | "auth_token": "***" if self.auth_token else None | Displayed (masked) in /info. |
| 121 | def _create_app(self): | Route + middleware setup begins. |
| 132 | async def health(request): | No auth check. |
| 139 | async def events(request): | No auth check. |
| 164 | async def publish(request): | No auth check. |
| 182 | async def info(request): | No auth check. |
| 190 | routes = [Route("/health", …), Route("/events", …), Route("/publish", …), Route("/info", …)] | Routes registered without Depends/middleware. |
| 197 | app = Starlette(routes=routes) | App created. |
| 200 | app = CORSMiddleware(app, …) | Only middleware added. |
Source sha256 (1.6.48, praisonaiagents/server/server.py): aac9497d515b5cb928070267b860b11ef38b537605e64659feef895b524ca7e4 (9,962 bytes).
Sibling (same package, same field name, *enforced*): praisonaiagents/ui/a2a/a2a.py:163-193.
Reproduction (empirical PoC)
poc/poc.py starts AgentServer with ServerConfig(auth_token="supersecret-not-actually-checked") and then sends unauthenticated requests to each route.
Run log (poc/run-log.txt):
[1] GET /info (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
body: {"name":"PraisonAI Agent Server","version":"1.0.0","clients":0,
"config":{"host":"127.0.0.1","port":18765,"cors_origins":[],
"auth_token":"***","max_connections":100}}
[2] POST /publish (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
body: {"success":true,"clients":0}
[3] GET /health (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
[4] GET /events (no Authorization) -> HTTP 200
VULNERABLE: 4 unauthenticated routes
VERDICT: VULNERABLE
EXIT 0High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.2, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 1.6.58 (ecosystem)1.6.58
1.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.58Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0