webob
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.8.11(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.8.11
Fix
- Fixed version
1.8.11pip install --upgrade webob==1.8.11
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-54770, GHSA-6hx8-3wjj-gr8g
WebOb: Open redirect in Location header normalization via leading C0 control / space characters
Summary
This is a third follow-up to CVE-2024-42353 / GHSA-mg3v-6m49-jhp3
and CVE-2026-44889 / GHSA-fh3h-vg37-cc95.
WebOb makes the Location header absolute when it serves a redirect. To stop a
relative or protocol-relative target from redirecting users off-host, it checks
the value for a URI scheme and for a leading //, then joins it against the
request URI with urllib.parse.urljoin(). The previous fix additionally stripped
ASCII tab/CR/LF from the value before those checks.
However, on Python 3.10+ urllib.parse.urljoin() (via urlsplit()) does more
than remove tab/CR/LF: **it also strips leading and trailing C0 control
characters (U+0000–U+001F) and spaces from the URL before parsing it.**
Because WebOb's guard checks (SCHEME_RE and startswith("//")) run against the
*un-stripped* value, a single leading space or control byte slips past them, andurljoin() then silently removes that byte and parses what remains as a
protocol-relative — or even absolute — URL. The result is an open redirect to an
attacker-controlled host.
Details
Response._make_location_absolute() (in src/webob/response.py) performed,
prior to the fix:
value = value.replace("\t", "").replace("\r", "").replace("\n", "")
if SCHEME_RE.search(value): # ^[a-z]+: -> already absolute, return as-is
return value
if value.startswith("//"): # neutralize protocol-relative URLs
value = f"/%2f{value[2:]}"
new_location = urlparse.urljoin(_request_uri(environ), value)
Consider the Location value " //www.example.com/test" (a single leading space):
\t, \r, \n — the leading space survives.SCHEME_RE (^[a-z]+:) does not match — the value starts with a space.value.startswith("//") is False — the value starts with a space, not /. The // → /%2f neutralization is skipped.urllib.parse.urljoin(_request_uri(environ), " //www.example.com/test") then strips the leading space before parsing, sees //www.example.com/test, treats it as protocol-relative, and returns http://www.example.com/test.The same bypass works with a value such as " https://www.example.com/test"
(leading space + a full scheme): SCHEME_RE does not match the space-prefixed
string, but urljoin() strips the space and returns the fully absolute
attacker URL https://www.example.com/test.
Any C0 control character works equally well in place of the space, e.g."\x00//www.example.com/test" or "\x1f//www.example.com/test", becauseurlsplit() strips the whole leading C0-control-and-space run.
Affected entry points
Location and serves the response (the classic redirect path).urllib.parse.urljoin() directly and was subject to the same character stripping.HTTPMovedPermanently, HTTPFound, HTTPSeeOther, HTTPTemporaryRedirect, HTTPPermanentRedirect, etc.) — these built their absolute Location with urlparse.urljoin(req.path_url, self.location) without going through _make_location_absolute() at all, so they bypassed even the tab/CR/LF strip and the // → /%2f neutralization. A protocol-relative location passed to e.g. HTTPFound(location="//evil.example") redirected off-host.Proof of Concept
from webob import Response
from webob.request import Request
res = Response()
res.status = "301"
res.location = " //www.example.com/test" # note the single leading space
req = Request.blank("/") # request host is "localhost"
print(req.get_response(res).location)
# Vulnerable (<= 1.8.10): http://www.example.com/test <-- open redirect
# Fixed: http://localhost/ //www.example.com/test
Absolute-URL variant:
res.location = " https://www.example.com/test"
# Vulnerable: https://www.example.com/test <-- off-host
# Fixed: http://localhost/ https://www.example.com/test
Via the HTTP exceptions:
from webob import exc
environ = {
"wsgi.url_scheme": "http", "SERVER_NAME": "localhost",
"SERVER_PORT": "80", "REQUEST_METHOD": "HEAD", "PATH_INFO": "/",
}
m = exc.HTTPFound(location="//www.example.com/test")
m(environ, lambda *a, **k: None)
print(m.location)
# Vulnerable: //www.example.com/test <-- open redirect
# Fixed: http://localhost/%2fwww.example.com/test
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker who controls (in whole or part) the redirect
target of an application built on WebOb can redirect a user from a trusted host to
an attacker-controlled host. This enables phishing and credential-theft campaigns
that abuse the trusted origin, and can be chained with OAuth/SSO redirect_uri
flows to leak tokens. Exploitation requires user interaction (following the
redirect). Confidentiality and integrity impact are limited (L); the scope is
changed (C) because the trust boundary of the originating site is crossed.
Patches
Fixed by replacing the use of urllib.parse.urljoin() with WebOb's own
RFC 3986 reference-resolution implementation, webob.util.urljoin(), which
resolves the reference **exactly as given, character for character, with no
whitespace or control-character removal**.
Response._make_location_absolute() now uses webob.util.urljoin().Request.relative_url() now uses webob.util.urljoin().webob.exc._HTTPMove now normalizes its Location through the same _make_location_absolute() code path as Response, so protocol-relative and whitespace-smuggled locations are neutralized there too.Users should upgrade to the patched release. There are no API changes.
Workarounds
Location header / redirect target to a fully-qualified URI whose host you control, or strictly allowlist redirect destinations before handing them to WebOb.https://yourhost/ (or a validated relative path with no leading whitespace/control bytes).References
urllib.parse URL stripping behavior (CPython 3.10+, removal of leading and trailing C0 control and space characters): https://docs.python.org/3/library/urllib.parse.htmlTo report a vulnerability to the Pylons Project please take a look at:
[email protected] (the Pylons Project requests a 90-day disclosure embargo)Credit
Reported via the Pylons Project security mailing list by:
Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 6.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 1.8.11 (ecosystem)1.8.11
1.8.11pip install --upgrade webob==1.8.11Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0