virtualenv
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed21.7.12(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
21.7.12
Fix
- Fixed version
21.7.12pip install --upgrade virtualenv==21.7.12
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-virtualenv-2026-102937, CVE-2026-102937, GHSA-x78j-v8h9-3j2q
Command injection via --prompt in activate.bat (batch activator)
BatchActivator.quote() returned its input unchanged, the only activator with
no escaping at all. --prompt, the VIRTUALENV_PROMPT environment variable,
and the config file all set the prompt, and activate.bat writes it straight
into @set "VAR=value". A prompt containing a double quote closes that string
early, and whatever follows runs as live cmd.exe syntax. For example, a venv
created with --prompt 'x" & calc & "' runs calc the moment someone runsactivate.bat.
Anyone who templates a prompt from untrusted input (a CI job using a branch
name, a wrapper script deriving an environment name from user input) hands an
attacker code execution in the shell of anyone who activates the resulting venv
on Windows.
Fixed in 21.7.12 by escaping the characters cmd.exe treats as live syntax
inside this construct.
Not rated by the source.
0, fixed 21.7.12 (ecosystem)21.7.12
21.7.12pip install --upgrade virtualenv==21.7.12Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0