Details
Impact
A remote unauthenticated WebSocket client can exercise this when the target endpoint accepts permessage-deflate offers and relies on maxMessagePayloadSize as its per-message resource limit. The attack sends a valid masked compressed text or data frame with RSV1 set and a compressed length below the configured frame/message caps; those pre-inflate checks pass, and the default accept-object path also bypasses the optional inflater-level max_message_size cap because it remains None. The user-visible effect is that application handlers may allocate, validate, join, and process inflated messages larger than the configured limit, enabling resource-exhaustion pressure on affected permessage-deflate endpoints. The local artifact demonstrates availability impact only, not confidentiality or integrity compromise.
Suggested fix
diff --git a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
index 3c060804..4514e3cb 100644
--- a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
+++ b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
@@ -1869,6 +1869,17 @@ class WebSocketProtocol:
if self.state == WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN:
self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsWebSocketLevel += compressedLen
self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsAppLevel += uncompressedLen
+
+ if self._isMessageCompressed:
+ self.message_data_total_length += uncompressedLen - compressedLen
+ if 0 < self.maxMessagePayloadSize < self.message_data_total_length:
+ self.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded = True
+ self._max_message_size_exceeded(
+ self.message_data_total_length,
+ self.maxMessagePayloadSize,
+ f"received WebSocket message size {self.message_data_total_length} exceeds payload limit of {self.maxMessagePayloadSize} octets",
+ )
+ return False
# incrementally validate UTF-8 payload
#
*Reported by Team Atlanta.*