Details
Defense-in-depth: Harden is_directory_name_allowed to reject absolute paths pathed_name.is_absolute()) and any .. component so it provides a secondary layer even if the primary validate_local_path call is accidentally omitted in future.
References
- Vendor security policy: https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/policy
- Submission endpoint: https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/new
- Parent advisory (incompletely fixed): GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w / CVE-2026-46345 — "Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in compliance-trestle – jinja"
- Coordinated disclosure batch (part of the same PathSecurityValidator remediation): GHSA-gg2g-p7xc-qqmm (SSTI RCE), GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858 (cache path traversal), GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8 (profile-import path traversal read), GHSA-w76h-q7c6-jpjp (SSRF)
- Fix commits (jinja-only scope): 247fcce289f60103f3d8e28d8ec51a6986b94fb6, 7d107b3ac53caca7bde97a6278b23cd739d94525
- Affected sinks: trestle/core/commands/author/catalog.py:69,90; author/ssp.py:97,111; author/prof.py:86,110; bypassed guard trestle/common/file_utils.py:95; write sink trestle/core/catalog/catalog_api.py:72; unused-here correct guard trestle/core/remote/security.py:326
- Additional unguarded siblings: trestle/core/commands/create.py:95, trestle/core/commands/replicate.py:90