lightrag-hku
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.5.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.5.5
Fix
- Fixed version
1.5.5pip install --upgrade lightrag-hku==1.5.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-85740, GHSA-vv3m-f8x4-7377
lightrag-hku: SSRF via IPv6-transition address bypass (NAT64, IPv4-compatible, 6to4) of the native-markdown image-download guard
Summary
LightRAG's native markdown parser downloads external images referenced by an uploaded markdown or textpack document. The only SSRF guard, _validated_addresses() in lightrag/parser/markdown/parser.py, resolves the image host and rejects it when the resolved IP is not is_global. That check is evaluated on the raw resolved address and never decodes IPv6 transition wrappers that embed an internal IPv4. Python's ipaddress classifies a NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96 and the RFC 8215 64:ff9b:1::/48 prefix), IPv4-compatible (::a.b.c.d), or 6to4 (2002::/16) literal that wraps an internal IPv4 as globally routable, so the guard passes it. On a host with NAT64/DNS64 routing the request is then delivered to the embedded internal target (loopback, RFC1918, or a cloud metadata endpoint), and the fetched body is ingested. The plain and IPv4-mapped (::ffff:) forms of the same internal address are correctly blocked, so this is an encoding that defeats the existing filter.
Affected component and versions
lightrag-hku (LightRAG), the native markdown image-download path.lightrag/parser/markdown/parser.py, guard _validated_addresses() (the if not (ip.is_global or ...) check), reached from _download() -> _build_guarded_opener().open(req).download_enabled = _env_bool("NATIVE_MD_IMAGE_DOWNLOAD_ENABLED", True).<= 1.5.4 (latest release at time of report, commit 9a45b64).Depends(combined_auth)); the host has NAT64/DNS64 routing for the encoded address to reach the internal endpoint.Vulnerable code vs the guarded sibling
Evaluated on the exact resolved addresses (CPython ipaddress):
| Form | address | is_global | guard verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| plain internal 127.0.0.1 | 127.0.0.1 | False | BLOCK (correct) |
| IPv4-mapped | ::ffff:7f00:1 | False | BLOCK (correct) |
| NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 | 64:ff9b::7f00:1 | True | PASS (bypass) |
| NAT64 RFC8215 64:ff9b:1::/48 | 64:ff9b:1::7f00:1 | True | PASS (bypass) |
| IPv4-compatible ::a.b.c.d | ::7f00:1 | True | PASS (bypass) |
| 6to4 2002::/16 | 2002:7f00:1:: | True | PASS (bypass) |
The guard already blocks the plain and IPv4-mapped internal forms (the forms the author tested), proving the intent is to reject internal destinations; it never canonicalizes the other transition wrappers, so they pass.
> Note — CPython version dependency of the table. The is_global verdicts above depend on the interpreter. CPython gh-113171 (backported to 3.10.14 / 3.11.9 / 3.12.3+, ~2024-04) added 64:ff9b:1::/48 and 2002::/16 to ipaddress._private_networks, so on any current patch release those two rows return is_global = False and are already blocked by the stdlib before the guard is reached. The `64:ff9b::/96` well-known NAT64 prefix and the IPv4-compatible `::/96` form bypass on every current CPython — and 64:ff9b::/96 is exactly the prefix real DNS64/NAT64 deployments use, so the vulnerability stands. The four-row table reflects a pre-gh-113171 interpreter. The fix classifies by the embedded IPv4 and therefore closes all forms regardless of interpreter version.
Severity
High. CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N, base score 7.1. AC:H reflects the NAT64/DNS64 network precondition for end-to-end reach; PR:L because document upload requires the API key; S:C because the request pivots into an internal network segment; C:H for internal/metadata/secret disclosure.
Proof of concept (deployed, both directions, verbatim)
Environment: three Docker containers on an IPv6-enabled network - an internal victim (10.66.0.2:80, RFC1918) serving a unique secret, a DNS64/NAT64 gateway owning 64:ff9b::/96 that forwards [64:ff9b::0a42:0002]:80 to 10.66.0.2:80, and an attacker host with a client-side route 64:ff9b::/96 via <gateway>. This models a client on an IPv6-only / NAT64+DNS64 network (AWS/GCP IPv6-only subnets, many mobile and corporate networks). The attacker runs the EXACT released guard code (_validated_addresses, _host_is_public, _build_guarded_opener, the _Guarded*Connection/Handler classes, sliced verbatim from v1.5.4 parser.py, only the logger import shimmed) plus a verbatim reproduction of the released _download() scheme and host precheck. Trigger in production: an uploaded document containing .
RUN 1, released v1.5.4 guard (VULNERABLE):
attack URL = http://[64:ff9b::0a42:0002]:80/logo.png
===== DIRECTION A: ATTACK (NAT64-wrapped internal address) =====
guard verdict : PASSED (fetched)
SECRET LEAKED : True
body : SSRF-LIGHTRAG-INTERNAL-METADATA-9f3a2b7c
===== control: plain internal address (must be BLOCKED) =====
verdict: BLOCKED at guard: non-public host blocked
===== DIRECTION B: PUBLIC address (must still be FETCHED) =====
guard verdict : PASSED (fetched)
public body : PUBLIC-OK-BODY
===== SUMMARY =====
attack_leaked_internal_secret = True
plain_internal_blocked = True
public_still_fetched = True
RUN 2, one-line-class decode fix applied (same inputs, same network):
===== DIRECTION A: ATTACK (NAT64-wrapped internal address) =====
guard verdict : BLOCKED at guard: non-public host blocked
SECRET LEAKED : False
===== control: plain internal address (must be BLOCKED) =====
verdict: BLOCKED at guard: non-public host blocked
===== DIRECTION B: PUBLIC address (must still be FETCHED) =====
guard verdict : PASSED (fetched)
public body : PUBLIC-OK-BODY
===== SUMMARY =====
attack_leaked_internal_secret = False
plain_internal_blocked = True
public_still_fetched = True
Fix-correctness matrix (isolated): genuine global IPv6 2606:4700:4700::1111 and 2001:4860:4860::8888 -> ALLOW (no false positive); NAT64/RFC8215/IPv4-compat/6to4 wrappers of an internal IPv4 -> BLOCK; NAT64 of a public IPv4 (64:ff9b::808:808 = 8.8.8.8) -> ALLOW.
Impact
A caller who can upload a markdown or textpack document (textpack uploads route to the native engine with zero config; markdown reaches it when the native engine is selected) can make the LightRAG server issue HTTP requests to internal-only addresses that the SSRF guard is meant to forbid, and the fetched body is ingested. On a deployment with NAT64/DNS64 routing this reaches cloud instance metadata (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200), loopback services, and RFC1918 internal hosts, exposing IAM credentials and internal service data.
Suggested fix
Decode the embedded IPv4 of any IPv6 transition wrapper and classify by the embedded IPv4 before the is_global check:
def _unwrap_embedded_ipv4(ip):
"""Return the IPv4 embedded in an IPv6 transition wrapper (IPv4-mapped,
IPv4-compatible, NAT64 64:ff9b::/96 and RFC8215 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4
2002::/16) so it is classified by IPv4 rules; else return ip unchanged."""
if ip.version != 6:
return ip
if ip.ipv4_mapped is not None:
return ip.ipv4_mapped
if getattr(ip, "sixtofour", None) is not None:
return ip.sixtofour
b = ip.packed
if b[:12] == b"\x00" * 12 and b[12:] not in (b"\x00\x00\x00\x00", b"\x00\x00\x00\x01"):
return ip_address(b[12:])
if b[:12] == b"\x00\x64\xff\x9b" + b"\x00" * 8:
return ip_address(b[12:])
if b[:6] == b"\x00\x64\xff\x9b\x00\x01":
return ip_address(b[12:])
return ipHigh Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 1.5.5 (ecosystem)1.5.5
1.5.5pip install --upgrade lightrag-hku==1.5.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0