Advisory

PYSEC-2026-4092

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

  • application configuration
  • deployment secrets
  • cloud or service credentials mounted into the runtime
  • CI/CD or automation tokens
  • other files available to the MCP server user

This issue does not require prior compromise of the internal network in deployments where the MCP service is intentionally exposed over HTTP/SSE to multiple users or external MCP clients. The attacker only needs the ability to invoke the upload tool. The server then reads the chosen path with its own process privileges and uploads it to Jira or Confluence.

If the intended security model is that every MCP caller is fully trusted with arbitrary read access to the server filesystem, that should be documented explicitly. Otherwise, server-local file path uploads should be opt-in and constrained to a configured upload root.

Suggested fixes:

  • Default-deny server-local path uploads in HTTP/SSE and multi-user deployments.
  • Add an explicit opt-in flag for server-local upload paths.
  • Require an allowlisted upload root and enforce it after realpath resolution.
  • Reject file:// URLs and remote UNC path forms before any filesystem operation.
  • Prefer client-provided file/resource blobs over server-local path strings for remote MCP deployments.

Sources & licences