Advisory

PYSEC-2026-4098

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

The PoC uses fake upload sinks and does not contact Atlassian. It demonstrates the vulnerable behavior: a caller-provided absolute server-local path is accepted, read, and delivered to the attachment sink.

Known Issue / Dupe Checks

Known advisories are different:

  • GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4: arbitrary file write through unconstrained Confluence download path.
  • GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: SSRF through unvalidated Atlassian URL headers.

Closest public non-security overlap:

  • issue #618: usability report that upload requires server-side paths.
  • issue #1163: unrelated upload failure on Data Center.
  • PRs #987 / #949: download-path hardening, not upload-source path containment.

No public issue/PR/advisory found for upload-side arbitrary local file read.

Suggested Fix

Add an explicit upload source policy, for example:

  • require MCP_ATLASSIAN_UPLOAD_BASE_DIR for server-local upload tools in HTTP/SSE/streamable mode
  • reject absolute paths unless they resolve inside that configured base directory
  • apply validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=upload_base_dir) before existence checks or reads
  • consider disabling server-local upload tools by default in HTTP mode unless an upload directory is configured

Add regression tests for both Confluence and Jira upload paths:

  • reject /etc/passwd
  • reject ../../../etc/passwd
  • reject symlinks escaping the upload base
  • accept a file inside the configured upload directory
  • verify READ_ONLY_MODE=true still blocks the write independently

Sources & licences