Details
The PoC uses fake upload sinks and does not contact Atlassian. It demonstrates the vulnerable behavior: a caller-provided absolute server-local path is accepted, read, and delivered to the attachment sink.
Known Issue / Dupe Checks
Known advisories are different:
GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4: arbitrary file write through unconstrained Confluence download path.GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: SSRF through unvalidated Atlassian URL headers.
Closest public non-security overlap:
- issue
#618: usability report that upload requires server-side paths. - issue
#1163: unrelated upload failure on Data Center. - PRs
#987/#949: download-path hardening, not upload-source path containment.
No public issue/PR/advisory found for upload-side arbitrary local file read.
Suggested Fix
Add an explicit upload source policy, for example:
- require
MCP_ATLASSIAN_UPLOAD_BASE_DIRfor server-local upload tools in HTTP/SSE/streamable mode - reject absolute paths unless they resolve inside that configured base directory
- apply
validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=upload_base_dir)before existence checks or reads - consider disabling server-local upload tools by default in HTTP mode unless an upload directory is configured
Add regression tests for both Confluence and Jira upload paths:
- reject
/etc/passwd - reject
../../../etc/passwd - reject symlinks escaping the upload base
- accept a file inside the configured upload directory
- verify
READ_ONLY_MODE=truestill blocks the write independently