Details
Expected output:
Direct /files/download as attacker -> 404
Project-scoped MCP resources/read -> cross-project-read-proof
Observed server logs during verification:
GET /api/v1/files/download/... 404 Not Found
POST /api/v1/mcp/project/<attacker-project-id>/streamable 200 OK
POST /api/v1/mcp/project/<attacker-project-id>/streamable 202 Accepted
POST /api/v1/mcp/project/<attacker-project-id>/streamable 200 OK
Impact
This is an authenticated IDOR / arbitrary file read issue in the MCP layer.
Any authenticated Langflow user who can access at least one project-scoped MCP endpoint can read files belonging to other users by supplying a victim file URI to resources/read.
Practical impact includes:
- Cross-user disclosure of uploaded documents, CSV files, JSON files, prompts, and other flow-backed artifacts
- Unauthorized access to sensitive business data stored in flow namespaces
- Easier exploitation when global MCP helpers reveal other users' flow IDs and file names
Suggested Remediations
- Authorize
resources/readagainst the authenticated context before calling storage. Resolveflow_idto a database object and require both:flow.user_id == current_user.idand, for project-scoped transports,flow.folder_id == current_project_id.
- Stop trusting arbitrary file-download URIs as resource identifiers. Instead, return opaque server-generated resource IDs from
resources/listand resolve them server-side to an already authorized object.
- Scope global MCP enumeration helpers to the authenticated user.
handle_list_resources()andhandle_list_tools()should not query all flows whenproject_id=None; they should return only flows owned by the current user, or require elevated privileges for broader discovery.
Fix Status (Maintainer Triage Update — 2026-09-22)
This report is accurate. The vulnerable code path described above (missing
ownership check in handle_read_resource()) has since been fixed.
Corrected affected version range: >= 1.6.8, <= 1.9.0 (not <= 1.8.3 —
confirmed still vulnerable through v1.9.0; the fix landed with the v1.9.1
release, not later).
Fixed in: v1.9.1 (GitHub Release published 2026-04-24), via PR
#12818 — "fix(mcp): close path traversal + cross-user disclosure (PVR0754098)".
- Backport commit on
release-1.9.1:f0fd436fe9829192ee550e6cb46961a01dd37032 - Corresponding commit on
main:b8fe970493fd5fb2e1fc71dfccc79f90b76058fa
The fix:
handle_read_resource()now requires an authenticated user context and resolves the namespace segment of the URI to aFlowrow scoped toFlow.user_id == current_user.id, additionally filtering onFlow.folder_id == project_idfor project-scoped MCP servers (src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/mcp_utils.py).- Rejects filenames containing
..,/, or\as defense-in-depth against path traversal, and applies the same containment check to the storage layer'sget_file/get_file_stream/delete_file/get_file_size(local.py/s3.py, both inlangflowandlfx). handle_list_resources()/handle_list_tools()are now scoped tocurrent_user.idon the global (non-project) MCP server, closing the cross-user enumeration this report also flagged.
Verified independently against langflow-ai/langflow @ 89444c3bb5
(release-1.11.0 branch, current as of 2026-09-22): the fix is present, and
the regression suite (src/backend/tests/unit/api/v1/test_mcp_utils.py,
21/21 passing) includes test_handle_read_resource_denies_other_users_flow,
which reproduces this report's exact cross-user scenario and asserts it now
raises ValueError("... access denied").