praisonai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.6.78(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.78
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.78pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.78
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-60091, GHSA-4w49-gwv8-fpjg
PraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF
Summary
PraisonAI's Async Jobs API enables its API-key middleware only when `PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY` is set, so by default every endpoint is unauthenticated. An unauthenticated POST /api/v1/runs accepts an attacker-controlled webhook_url; on job completion the server POSTs the job payload to it via httpx. The webhook_url has an SSRF validator (gethostbyname + private-IP check), but it validates at request time while httpx re-resolves at connection time — a DNS-rebinding TOCTOU that reaches internal services. Runtime-confirmed as an unauthenticated, blind SSRF (the internal canary received the POST; the internal response is not returned to the attacker). Severity Medium.
Details
Affected component
praisonai 4.6.63. Files: src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py, jobs/router.py, jobs/executor.py, jobs/models.py.Vulnerable code / root cause
Path:src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/server.py
Function:create_app
Snippet:
jobs_api_key = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY")
# ...
if jobs_api_key:
app.add_middleware(JobsAPIKeyMiddleware) # auth ONLY when env var is set
Issue: with the env var unset (default), no auth middleware is added → all endpoints unauthenticated. Default bind is 127.0.0.1.
Path:src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/router.py
Function:submit_job
Snippet:
@router.post("", response_model=JobSubmitResponse, status_code=202)
async def submit_job(request, response, body: JobSubmitRequest, ...):
# no auth dependency; body.webhook_url is attacker-controlled
job = Job(prompt=body.prompt, webhook_url=body.webhook_url, ...)
await executor.submit(job)
Issue: attacker-controlled webhook_url flows into the job with no authentication on the endpoint.
Path:src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py (validator) and src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py (sink)
Function:validate_webhook_url → _send_webhook
Snippet:
# models.py validate_webhook_url (CHECK time)
ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).is_private or ...:
raise ValueError("Webhook URL resolves to a private or restricted network address")
# executor.py _send_webhook (CONNECT time, re-resolves, no pinning)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as client:
response = await client.post(job.webhook_url, json=payload, ...)
Issue: the validator resolves the hostname at validation time but does not pin the IP for the httpx.post connection → DNS rebinding (independent resolution at check vs connect) bypasses it and reaches internal services.
Attack flow
PRAISONAI_JOBS_API_KEY (default → unauth).POST /api/v1/runs with webhook_url = a rebinding domain.httpx.post re-resolves to an internal IP and connects → SSRF to internal.Why existing protection is bypassed
Auth is opt-in (only when the env var is set). The webhook_url validator resolves at check time but does not pin the IP for the connection → DNS-rebinding TOCTOU. (Correction to an earlier static note: the guard exists but is bypassable.)
Security boundary
Unauthenticated network peer → server-side request to internal services (Scope: Changed). Default bind 127.0.0.1 limits remote reach unless the operator binds non-loopback.
Proof of Concept
Environment
Real Jobs API (python -m praisonai.jobs.server, no API key) in a local runtime (127.0.0.1:18085), resolver pointed at the controlled rebinding DNS, internal canary Docker-internal only. Runnable assets: PraisonAI-Runtime-Repro\runtime-files\ (docker-compose.jobs.yml).
Steps to reproduce
PRAI-04-01-Jobs-Submit-NoAuth: POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello"} → 202 (no auth).PRAI-04-02-Jobs-Webhook-SSRF-Blind: POST /api/v1/runs {"prompt":"hello","webhook_url":"http://rebind.lab:8081/secret"} → 202.Expected result
Unauthenticated job submission should be rejected; the webhook SSRF guard should prevent reaching internal services regardless of DNS timing.
Impact
Unauthenticated job submission (LLM cost abuse); SSRF to internal services (blind, DNS-rebinding); exfiltration of the job result to an attacker-controlled webhook.
Suggested remediation
webhook_url: resolve once, reject private/loopback/CGNAT/metadata, then pin and connect to the validated IP; disable redirects.High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.2, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
0, fixed 4.6.78 (ecosystem)4.6.78
4.6.78pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.78Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0