grep-cli
Affected
- introduced
0.0.0-0, fixed0.1.6(semver)
Fixed versions
0.1.6
Fix
- Fixed version
0.1.6cargo update -p grep-cli --precise 0.1.6
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2021-3013, GHSA-g4xg-fxmg-vcg5
grep-cli may run arbitrary executables on Windows
On Windows in versions of grep-cli prior to 0.1.6, it's possible for some
of the routines to execute arbitrary executables. In particular, a quirk of
the Windows process execution API is that it will automatically consider the
current directory before other directories when resolving relative binary
names. Therefore, if you use grep-cli to read decompressed files in an
untrusted directory with that directory as the CWD, a malicious actor to could
put, e.g., a gz.exe binary in that directory and grep-cli will use the
malicious actor's version of gz.exe instead of the system's.
This is also technically possible on Unix as well, but only if the PATH
variable contains .. Conventionally, they do not.
A DecompressionReader has been fixed to automatically resolve binary names
using PATH, instead of relying on the Windows API to do it.
If you use grep-cli's CommandReader with a std::process::Command value
on Windows, then it is recommended to either construct the Command with an
absolute binary name, or use grep-cli's new
`resolve_binary`
helper function.
To be clear, grep-cli 0.1.6 mitigates this issue in two ways:
DecompressionReader will resolve decompression programs to absolutepaths automatically using the PATH environment variable, instead of relying
on Windows APIs to do it (which would result in the undesirable behavior of
checking the CWD for a program first).
resolve_binary, was added to help users of this cratemitigate this behavior when they need to create their ownstd::process::Command. For example,
ripgrep uses `grep_cli::resolve_binary`
on the argument given to its --pre flag.
While the first mitigation fixes this issue for sensible values of PATH
when doing decompression search, the second mitigation is imperfect. The more
fundamental issue is that std::process::Command is itself vulnerable to this.
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 9.8, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
0.0.0-0, fixed 0.1.6 (semver)0.1.6
0.1.6cargo update -p grep-cli --precise 0.1.6Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0