Advisory

RUSTSEC-2023-0007

Also known as: CVE-2022-4304, GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4

Summary

Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption

Details

A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation
which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a
Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker
would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for
decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,
RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.

For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an
encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a
genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send
trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a
sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master
secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the
application data sent over that connection.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2023-02-07 12:00 UTC
Modified
2023-11-08 04:10 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

openssl-src

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 111.25.0, introduced 300.0.0, fixed 300.0.12 (semver)

Fixed versions

111.25.0, 300.0.12

Fix

  • Fixed version 111.25.0
    cargo update -p openssl-src --precise 111.25.0
  • Fixed version 300.0.12
    cargo update -p openssl-src --precise 300.0.12

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences