Advisory

RUSTSEC-2023-0029

Also known as: GHSA-wvc4-j7g5-4f79

Summary

TLS certificate common name validation bypass

Details

The NATS official Rust clients are vulnerable to MitM when using TLS.

The common name of the server's TLS certificate is validated against
the hostname provided by the server's plaintext INFO message
during the initial connection setup phase. A MitM proxy can tamper with
the host field's value by substituting it with the common name of a
valid certificate it controls, fooling the client into accepting it.

Reproduction steps

  1. The NATS Rust client tries to establish a new connection
  2. The connection is intercepted by a MitM proxy
  3. The proxy makes a separate connection to the NATS server
  4. The NATS server replies with an INFO message
  5. The proxy reads the INFO, alters the host JSON field and passes the tampered INFO back to the client
  6. The proxy upgrades the client connection to TLS, presenting a certificate issued by a certificate authority present in the client's keychain. In the previous step the host was set to the common name of said certificate
  7. rustls accepts the certificate, having verified that the common name matches the attacker-controlled value it was given
  8. The client has been fooled by the MitM proxy into accepting the attacker-controlled certificate

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2023-03-24 12:00 UTC
Modified
2023-11-08 09:57 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

nats

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.9.0, fixed 0.24.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.24.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.24.1
    cargo update -p nats --precise 0.24.1

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences