Advisory

RUSTSEC-2023-0096

Also known as: CVE-2023-42811, GHSA-423w-p2w9-r7vq

Summary

Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure

Details

Summary

In the AES GCM implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached,
the decrypted ciphertext (i.e. the correct plaintext) is
exposed even if tag verification fails.

Impact

If a program using the aes-gcm crate's decrypt_in_place*
APIs accesses the buffer after decryption failure, it will
contain a decryption of an unauthenticated input. Depending
on the specific nature of the program this may enable
Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) which can cause a
catastrophic breakage of the cipher including full
plaintext recovery.

Details

As seen in the implementation of decrypt_in_place_detached for
AES GCM, if the tag verification fails, an error is returned.
Because the decryption of the ciphertext is done in place,
the plaintext contents are now exposed via buffer.

This should ideally not be the case - as noted in page 17 of
NIST's publication Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC:

In Step 8, the result of Step 7 is compared with the
authentication tag that was received as an input: if
they are identical, then the plaintext is returned;
otherwise,FAIL is returned.

This is seems correctly addressed in the AES GCM SIV
implementation, where the decrypted buffer is encrypted
again before the error is returned - this fix is
straightforward to implement in AES GCM. To ensure that
these types of cases are covered during testing, it
would be valuable to add test cases like 23, 24 etc
from project wycheproof to ensure that when a bad tag
is used, there is an error on decryption and that the
plaintext value is not exposed.

PoC

To reproduce this issue, I'm using test case 23 from
project wycheproof.

    let key = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f"));
    let nonce = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("505152535455565758595a5b"));
    let tag = GenericArray::from_slice(&hex!("d9847dbc326a06e988c77ad3863e6083")); // bad tag
    let mut ct = hex!("eb156d081ed6b6b55f4612f021d87b39");
    let msg = hex!("202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f");
    let aad = hex!("");
    let cipher = Aes128Gcm::new(&key);
    let _plaintext = cipher.decrypt_in_place_detached(&nonce, &aad, &mut ct, &tag);
    assert_eq!(ct, msg);

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 4.7, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Dates

Published
2023-11-22 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-12 18:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

aes-gcm

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.10.0, fixed 0.10.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.10.3

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.10.3
    cargo update -p aes-gcm --precise 0.10.3

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

This record names its own licence, CC BY 4.0, which differs from the source's (CC0-1.0).

Sources & licences