bytes
Affected
- introduced
1.2.1, fixed1.11.1(semver)
Fixed versions
1.11.1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.11.1cargo update -p bytes --precise 1.11.1
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-25541, GHSA-434x-w66g-qw3r
Integer overflow in BytesMut::reserve
In the unique reclaim path of BytesMut::reserve, the condition
if v_capacity >= new_cap + offset
uses an unchecked addition. When new_cap + offset overflows usize in release builds, this condition may incorrectly pass, causing self.cap to be set to a value that exceeds the actual allocated capacity. Subsequent APIs such as spare_capacity_mut() then trust this corrupted cap value and may create out-of-bounds slices, leading to UB.
This behavior is observable in release builds (integer overflow wraps), whereas debug builds panic due to overflow checks.
PoC
use bytes::*;
fn main() {
let mut a = BytesMut::from(&b"hello world"[..]);
let mut b = a.split_off(5);
// Ensure b becomes the unique owner of the backing storage
drop(a);
// Trigger overflow in new_cap + offset inside reserve
b.reserve(usize::MAX - 6);
// This call relies on the corrupted cap and may cause UB & HBO
b.put_u8(b'h');
}
Workarounds
Users of BytesMut::reserve are only affected if integer overflow checks are configured to wrap. When integer overflow is configured to panic, this issue does not apply.
Not rated by the source.
1.2.1, fixed 1.11.1 (semver)1.11.1
1.11.1cargo update -p bytes --precise 1.11.1Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0
This record names its own licence, CC BY 4.0, which differs from the source's (CC0-1.0).