boxlite
Affected
- introduced
0.0.0-0, fixed0.9.0(semver)
Fixed versions
0.9.0
Fix
- Fixed version
0.9.0cargo update -p boxlite --precise 0.9.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46703, GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j, GO-2026-5344, PYSEC-2026-298
OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write
Affected versions of boxlite extract OCI image layer tarballs without
fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer
containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g.escape -> /tmp) followed by a file entry that resolves through that
symlink (e.g. escape/<path>/pwned.txt) caused the extractor to write
the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory.
The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through aSafeRoot handle (openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on Linux, lexical fallback
elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root,
even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same
layer.
This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any
user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including viaSimpleBox(rootfs_path=...) from an untrusted local layout.
Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 10, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
0.0.0-0, fixed 0.9.0 (semver)0.9.0
0.9.0cargo update -p boxlite --precise 0.9.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0