Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0148

Also known as: CVE-2026-46703, GHSA-f396-4rp4-7v2j, GO-2026-5344, PYSEC-2026-298

Summary

OCI layer symlink escape → arbitrary host write

Details

Affected versions of boxlite extract OCI image layer tarballs without
fully containing path resolution to the extraction root. A crafted layer
containing a symlink whose target is an absolute on-host path (e.g.
escape -> /tmp) followed by a file entry that resolves through that
symlink (e.g. escape/<path>/pwned.txt) caused the extractor to write
the payload to the host filesystem outside the intended rootfs directory.

The fix in v0.9.0 routes every destructive filesystem operation through a
SafeRoot handle (openat2(RESOLVE_IN_ROOT) on Linux, lexical fallback
elsewhere) so that no tar entry can resolve outside the extraction root,
even with adversarial symlinks placed by earlier entries in the same
layer.

This is a container-escape during image extraction, exploitable by any
user who pulls or loads a malicious OCI image — including via
SimpleBox(rootfs_path=...) from an untrusted local layout.

Severity

Critical Basis: CVSS v3 score 10, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-05-16 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-12 18:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

boxlite

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.9.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.9.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.9.0
    cargo update -p boxlite --precise 0.9.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences