Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0199

Also known as: None

Summary

Panic in bcrypt::verify on non-ASCII hash input

Details

bcrypt::verify(password, hash) and HashParts::from_str(hash) panic in
str::slice_error_fail when given a 60-byte &str containing a multi-byte
UTF-8 character at certain byte positions.

Impact

Any Rust code that calls bcrypt::verify (or HashParts::from_str) with an
attacker-controlled hash string will panic. The bcrypt crate is
#![forbid(unsafe_code)], so this is limited to a denial-of-service and
cannot lead to memory corruption.

Realistic attack contexts include:

  • Rust authentication services reading hashes from a database that was previously compromised via, e.g., SQL injection. The attacker can then crash the service on every login attempt against the tampered account.
  • CLI tools accepting hashes from stdin or command-line arguments.
  • Password managers or vault services loading hashes from untrusted configuration sources.

Root cause

split_hash performed five &str slicing operations on the input hash:
&hash[1..3], &hash[4..6], &hash[7..], &salt_and_hash[..22], and
&salt_and_hash[22..]. None of these were char-boundary-checked. Any input
where a multi-byte UTF-8 character spanned one of those byte positions
caused a panic.

This is a regression of the fix originally shipped in 2021 for issue #62
(commit 0833509). The regression was introduced in the parser rewrite in
PR #95 (commit e9a8394, released as 0.19.0).

The pre-existing regression test does_no_error_on_char_boundary_splitting
was not removed, but was silently rendered ineffective by the new
bytes[0] != b'$' guard, which rejected its input earlier and prevented
it from reaching the buggy slices — leaving CI green through the regression.

Fix

split_hash now rejects any hash string containing non-ASCII bytes up
front. A valid bcrypt hash is always exactly 60 ASCII bytes, so this
closes the entire class of byte-boundary panics rather than guarding each
slice individually.

The fix was merged in PR #103 and released as bcrypt 0.19.2 on 2026-06-20.

Downstream impact

pyca/bcrypt (which depended on bcrypt 0.19.1) is not affected. Its
Python-side wrapper performs its own byte-level salt parsing before
invoking bcrypt::hash_with_salt, and never reaches the buggy code path
in split_hash or verify.

Severity

Medium Basis: CVSS v3 score 5.3, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Dates

Published
2026-06-20 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-07-04 08:30 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

bcrypt

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.19.0, fixed 0.19.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.19.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.19.2
    cargo update -p bcrypt --precise 0.19.2

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences