nostr-relay-pool
Affected
- introduced
0.0.0-0, fixed0.44.2(semver)
Fixed versions
0.44.2
Fix
- Fixed version
0.44.2cargo update -p nostr-relay-pool --precise 0.44.2
Advisory
Also known as: GHSA-f96q-5f6p-v7cj
Verification cache poisoning allows forged Nostr events to bypass signature validation
The nostr-relay-pool crate cached the result of event signature verification
before the check was actually performed. Because the entry was inserted
unconditionally, a first delivery whose signature failed was still recorded
in the cache. A subsequent delivery of the same event (identical ID,
but with a forged signature) would then hit the cache, causing signature
verification to be skipped entirely. The forged event was passed on toNostrDatabase::save_event() as if it had been validated.
Applications that connect to untrusted or compromised Nostr relays and persist
received events are vulnerable. An attacker can inject arbitrary events
without a valid signature into the application's trusted database, enabling
impersonation of any public key or corruption of application state derived from
stored events.
The issue does not compromise confidentiality or availability. It solely
undermines the integrity of stored event data.
The fix, released in version 0.44.2, moves the cache insertion to occur only
after a successful signature verification, so that failed attempts never create
a cache entry.
Credit
Discovered and reported by Ali Al-Sorehi
High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
0.0.0-0, fixed 0.44.2 (semver)0.44.2
0.44.2cargo update -p nostr-relay-pool --precise 0.44.2Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0