Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0232

Also known as: None

Summary

Processing of unverified relay events

Details

The processed events received from a relay through admission-policy and database
paths before verifying that the serialized fields matched the claimed event ID and
signature. In particular, a database result for the claimed ID could cause
verification to be skipped. The verification cache also keyed successful checks by a
64-bit hash instead of the complete event ID.

A malicious relay could send an event whose claimed ID referred to a known database
entry while its content, tags, author, or signature differed from that ID. The forged
event could then reach policy callbacks or other SDK processing as if it were
authentic. A cache-key collision provided a second path for an unverified event to be
treated as previously verified. This undermines event integrity but does not reveal
private keys or enable the attacker to produce a valid signature for the altered
event.

The SDK now verifies each event before policy evaluation, database lookup, or
propagation decisions, and the verification cache stores the complete EventId so a
truncated hash collision cannot stand in for successful verification.

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-08-01 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-08-02 18:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

nostr-relay-pool

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.44.3 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.44.3

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.44.3
    cargo update -p nostr-relay-pool --precise 0.44.3

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences