Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0333

Also known as: GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj

Summary

Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path

Details

ParserConfig::max_events, max_nodes, max_total_scalar_bytes,
max_merge_keys, alias_anchor_ratio and the alias jump factor were
enforced only by the two Value loaders. A typed target with a
default-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer,
which never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect
on from_str::<T> for a struct target. The default document-length,
depth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was
unbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for
hostile input.

Version 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and
adds cross-path parity tests.

Users who cannot upgrade can deserialize into noyalib::Value first and
convert with from_value, or rely on max_document_length and
max_depth, which were always applied on every path.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-10-06 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-08 15:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

noyalib

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.0.53 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.0.53

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.0.53
    cargo update -p noyalib --precise 0.0.53

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC BY 4.0

This record names its own licence, CC BY 4.0, which differs from the source's (CC0-1.0).

Sources & licences