Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0344

Also known as: None

Summary

Decompression bomb in ruzstd: a tiny input can exhaust memory (OOM)

Details

A crafted .zst input under 128 KB can force ruzstd to allocate several gigabytes at once, crashing the process with an out-of-memory condition. Since ruzstd is a decoder for untrusted input, a single small file is enough to take down anything decoding it.

The compressed size of a block was capped at 128 KB, but a compressed block's decompressed size was never checked against Block_Maximum_Size = min(Window_Size, 128 KiB) (RFC 8878). In execute_sequences the output was built with no running bound and no flush between blocks, so one block could expand to gigabytes — bypassing both the configured window-size limit and the block-by-block streaming that would otherwise release memory. (A related u32 counter overflow on such a block caused an additional panic.)

This is a denial of service only; memory access stays in bounds (no corruption, no RCE).

ruzstd is also built as a dependency of the Rust standard library via rustc-dep-of-std; in the toolchain it is used only to load zstd-compressed debug symbols, so the toolchain-side impact is limited.

Fixed in 0.9.1 (commit d3907c9), which enforces the per-block output bound. Upgrade to ruzstd >= 0.9.1.

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-10-11 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-10-13 10:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

ruzstd

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.9.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.9.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.9.1
    cargo update -p ruzstd --precise 0.9.1

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences