Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0429

Also known as: CVE-2026-115909, GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3

Summary

zip: ZipArchive::extract aborts the process on a symlink entry with a large declared size

Details

ZipArchive::extract() sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed
size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of
entry data:

let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);

Both inputs are attacker-controlled. ZipFile::size() returns
uncompressed_size verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full u64
by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against
the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate
bound for a symlink target. ZipFile::is_symlink() is decided entirely by the
S_IFLNK bit of the external-attributes field.

Vec::with_capacity() is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls
handle_alloc_error() and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is
not caught by catch_unwind(), is unaffected by panic = "unwind", and is not
contained by running the call on a worker thread.

A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One Stored entry flagged S_IFLNK with a
ZIP64 field declaring uncompressed_size = 2^62 and a zero-byte payload makes
extract() fail with:

memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134

The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM:
Vec::with_capacity() maps address space without touching pages, so resident
memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under
a ulimit -v cap or a memory-constrained container the threshold drops far
enough that a plain 32-bit uncompressed_size with no ZIP64 field suffices.

Applications that extract archives from untrusted input are affected on Unix and
Windows targets with default features and no special configuration: upload
handling, mail-attachment processing, package and artefact ingestion, backup
restore and container-image layer extraction. No confidentiality or integrity
property is affected: there is no memory unsafety, no out-of-bounds access, no
disclosure and no data corruption.

The fix landed in zip-rs/zip2#984 and
shipped in 9.0.0.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-10-22 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-02 10:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

zip

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 9.0.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

9.0.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 9.0.0
    cargo update -p zip --precise 9.0.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences