Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0494

Also known as: CVE-2026-48110, GHSA-4r3c-5hpg-58qr

Summary

SSH message fields allocated before their size is checked

Details

Many of russh's client and server message handlers decoded length-prefixed strings, byte fields and name-lists from the peer into owned String, Vec or name-list values first and only checked their size and meaning afterwards. This includes the algorithm name-lists in SSH_MSG_KEXINIT, which a server parses during the initial key exchange, before any authentication.

A peer can fill these fields with oversized or highly fragmented values, for example a name-list of hundreds of thousands of one-letter algorithm names, and make russh allocate far more memory than the packet itself takes. With many concurrent connections this can exhaust the memory of a server process.

From 0.61.0, name-lists are rejected before they are split into separate strings when they are longer than 16 KiB or hold more than 1,024 entries, and the key exchange decodes its algorithm lists through this bounded decoder.

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 7.5, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Dates

Published
2026-06-11 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-12 08:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

russh

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.34.0, fixed 0.61.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.61.0

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.61.0
    cargo update -p russh --precise 0.61.0

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences