Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0503

Also known as: None

Summary

eazip: symlink-target validation checks the wrong argument, allowing extraction path escapes on Windows

Details

When extracting archives, eazip validates symlink entries before writing
them. The validation function validate_symlink() (src/utils/mod.rs) scans
for backslash and NUL bytes, but passes the symlink's *name* where the
symlink's *target* was intended:

memchr2(b'\\', b'\0', name.as_bytes()) // should be target.as_bytes()

As a result, symlink *targets* containing backslash or NUL bytes pass
validation. On Windows, backslash is a path separator, so targets such as
..\..\..\Windows\system32\evil.exe also defeat the remaining depth check,
which splits on / only. A crafted archive can therefore create symlinks
that resolve outside the extraction directory — including UNC targets such as
\\host\share\... — redirecting writes to arbitrary filesystem locations
chosen by the attacker.

Applications that extract untrusted archives with eazip on Windows targets
are affected; on Unix targets backslash is not a separator, which limits
exposure there.

The vulnerability was introduced in version 0.2.5 and fixed in 0.2.7
(a1phyr/eazip@0e4caa13),
which rejects backslash and NUL bytes in the symlink target. It was
privately reported to the maintainer on 2026-11-06 and credited in the
0.2.7 release notes.

Severity

High Basis: CVSS v3 score 8.6, vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N

Dates

Published
2026-11-07 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-12 08:00 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

eazip

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.2.5, fixed 0.2.7 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.2.7

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.2.7
    cargo update -p eazip --precise 0.2.7

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences