Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0551

Also known as: CVE-2026-123599, GHSA-wjgj-fvg9-65w9, RUSTSEC-2026-0558

Summary

Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated (hickory-proto)

Details

Before 0.26.0-beta.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation ignored the DNS class when grouping records into RRsets and left records of a class other than IN out of signature checking, then marked them secure if the IN records validated. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could add forged records of another class, including a DS record, and have them returned as validated.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-09-03 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-17 10:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

hickory-proto

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.26.0-beta.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.26.0-beta.1

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.26.0-beta.1
    cargo update -p hickory-proto --precise 0.26.0-beta.1

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences