Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0557

Also known as: CVE-2026-123590, GHSA-57pw-897j-v4j6, RUSTSEC-2026-0550

Summary

Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof when another record at the same name is signed

Details

When DNSSEC validation collected the NSEC and NSEC3 records from a response's authority section to check a denial of existence, it kept a record if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. A response could therefore pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name, and the forged record was used in the nonexistence proof.

An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can use this to get a forged NXDOMAIN or NODATA answer accepted as secure.

This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.

The fix keeps an NSEC or NSEC3 record only when its own signature validated.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-09-03 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-17 10:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

hickory-net

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.26.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.26.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.26.2
    cargo update -p hickory-net --precise 0.26.2

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences