Advisory

RUSTSEC-2026-0558

Also known as: CVE-2026-123599, GHSA-wjgj-fvg9-65w9, RUSTSEC-2026-0551

Summary

Records with a DNS class other than the query's marked secure without being validated

Details

When DNSSEC validation grouped a response's records into RRsets, it did not take the DNS class into account, and records of a class other than IN were left out before signatures were checked. If the IN records validated, the records of other classes (such as CH or HS) were marked secure too.

An attacker who can answer or modify DNS responses can add forged records of another class to a response and have them returned as validated. A forged DS record of another class can also get past validation, which lets any DNSKEY for the child zone be accepted and any answer from that zone be forged. How much this matters depends on how the application treats records of an unexpected class.

This affects DNSSEC validation through DnssecDnsHandle when built with dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs.

The fix rejects a whole response if any record in its answer, authority or additional section has a class different from the query's.

Severity

Not rated by the source.

Dates

Published
2026-09-03 12:00 UTC
Modified
2026-11-17 10:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

hickory-net

crates.io · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0.0.0-0, fixed 0.26.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.26.2

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.26.2
    cargo update -p hickory-net --precise 0.26.2

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: RustSec Advisory Database · CC0-1.0

Sources & licences