Advisory

GHSA-25rp-h46x-2hjm

Also known as: CVE-2026-44588, GO-2026-4993

Summary

SiYuan: Electron Renderer RCE via decodeURIComponent-driven tooltip XSS in aria-label sink (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34585)

Details

Summary

The tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (", ', <, literal &lt;) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal < character (a real <, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal <, parses the <img> element, and the onerror handler fires.

Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require('child_process') is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.

Doc titles, AV column names + descriptions, AV select options, file-tree tooltips all reach this sink because they're rendered into class="ariaLabel" elements with aria-label="${escapeAriaLabel(...)}". Doc title is the easiest plant — any user with create/rename access lands the payload, and the file survives .sy.zip round-trip without modification.

Why a "double HTML-decode" framing is wrong

A naïve reading of the chain might suggest that &amp;lt; (the encoder output) decodes once at attribute-parse time to &lt;, then a second time at innerHTML time to < — yielding a tag. That's incorrect and confirmed false by direct browser testing. Per the HTML5 spec, character references in DataState produce CHARACTER tokens (text), not TagOpenState transitions: the < resulting from a &lt; reference is text data, never a tag-open delimiter. So the HTML-entity-only payload renders as visible literal text, not as a tag.

The actual bypass relies on decodeURIComponent producing a literal < (not a character reference) before innerHTML parses it. Literal < characters in the input stream DO trigger TagOpenState. URL encoding is the right vehicle because the encoder ignores %XX while the consumer chain decodes it.

Details

Encoder. app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25:

export const escapeAriaLabel = (html: string) => {
    if (!html) { return html; }
    return html.replace(/"/g, "&quot;").replace(/'/g, "&apos;")
        .replace(/</g, "&amp;lt;").replace(/&lt;/g, "&amp;lt;");
};

The four replacements only cover HTML special chars. %XX URL escapes are not touched.

Source — search-result rendering. app/src/search/util.ts:1406:

<span class="b3-list-item__text ariaLabel" ... aria-label="${escapeAriaLabel(title)}">${escapeGreat(title)}</span>

Same pattern at :1448, protyle/render/av/blockAttr.ts:205, protyle/render/av/col.ts:134, protyle/render/av/select.ts:36, search/unRef.ts:113. The title is built from getNotebookName(item.box) + getDisplayName(item.hPath, false) (line 1398). The hPath returned by /api/search/fullTextSearchBlock carries the user-set doc title verbatim — %XX URL-escapes pass through, only HTML special chars are entity-encoded by the kernel.

Consumer. app/src/block/popover.ts:33,144:

let tip = aElement.getAttribute("aria-label") || "";       // literal stored attribute value
// ... branch logic that doesn't apply to plain search results ...
showTooltip(decodeURIComponent(tip), aElement, ...);       // ← decodes %XX into raw chars

decodeURIComponent is presumably present to handle URL-encoded asset paths in some hyperlink tooltips, but it's applied unconditionally to every aria-label-sourced tip — that's what enables this bypass.

Sink. app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41:

messageElement.innerHTML = message;     // ← HTML parser sees the now-decoded raw `<` and starts parsing tags

Decode-chain trace for in-memory title %3Cimg src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan')"%3E (URL-encoded < > ', literal "):

| step | result |
|------|--------|
| in-memory title | %3Cimg src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan')"%3E |
| escapeAriaLabel writes (only " and ' get encoded — neither appears here as raw chars when ' is %27) | %3Cimg src=x onerror=&quot;alert(%27SiYuan%27)&quot;%3E |
| HTML attribute set: aria-label="..." ; browser one-decodes named entities when storing | in-DOM value = %3Cimg src=x onerror="alert(%27SiYuan%27)"%3E |
| getAttribute("aria-label") | %3Cimg src=x onerror="alert(%27SiYuan%27)"%3E (verbatim) |
| decodeURIComponent(tip) | `<img src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan')">` (real < ' > chars) |
| messageElement.innerHTML = … | HTML parser tokenizes raw <img>, creates element, fails to load src=x, fires onerror → JS runs |

Renderer + reachability. Renderer posture and auto-admin gates same as the AV-name advisory (Advisory 1): nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false at app/electron/main.js:407-411; empty-AccessAuthCode local auto-admin at kernel/model/session.go:261-287; chrome-extension:// Origin allowlist at session.go:277.

Suggested fix

  1. Primary — `app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41`: replace
   messageElement.innerHTML = message;

with

   messageElement.textContent = message;

For tooltips that legitimately need markup (memo rendering, hyperlink preview cards), introduce an explicit {html: true} flag on showTooltip(...) and route the message through DOMPurify.sanitize(message) before assigning to innerHTML.

  1. Drop `decodeURIComponent` at `popover.ts:144` for the generic aria-label path. Apply it only on the few callers that intentionally pass URL-encoded asset paths (e.g. the local-asset hyperlink preview branch already inside the function), and apply it inside try/catch with a clear scope. Aria-label content is not URL-encoded by design; decoding it is a footgun that converts otherwise-safe attributes into pre-parsed HTML.
  1. Consolidate the four escape helpers in app/src/util/escape.ts (escapeHtml, escapeAttr, escapeAriaLabel, escapeGreat) into one Lute.EscapeHTMLStr-equivalent that escapes &, <, >, ", '. Context-specific encoders without compile-time enforcement keep producing bug-class variants.
  1. (Defense-in-depth) Switch the main BrowserWindow to contextIsolation: true with a preload bridge — caps every future renderer XSS at "DOM only," not RCE.

---

Reproduction (copy-paste-ready)

Tested on Windows with SiYuan v3.6.5 (kernel + Electron) and Microsoft Edge as the offline parser-validation engine. Linux/macOS users substitute py with python3 and use any modern Chromium-based browser (Edge/Chrome/Brave) for the standalone validation step.

Prereqs

  1. Install SiYuan v3.6.5 from https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases and launch once. Do not set an `AccessAuthCode` (default).
  2. Verify the kernel is up:
   curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/version
   # → {"code":0,"msg":"","data":"3.6.5"}
  1. Create at least one notebook (the file tree's "+" button) so lsNotebooks returns a usable id. Pin variables:
   API=http://127.0.0.1:6806
   NOTEBOOK_ID=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/notebook/lsNotebooks \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
     | python -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["notebooks"][0]["id"])')
   echo "Using notebook: $NOTEBOOK_ID"

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-08 19:08 UTC
Modified
2026-06-08 20:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences