Details
Add SuciSupiPair (suci-0-001-01-0-0-0-0000000002, imsi-001010000000002) to map.
... repeated for the same SUCI/SUPI ...
EapAuthComfirmRequest
[WARN] EAP-AKA' failure: EAP-AKA' integrity check fail
| 200 | 127.0.0.1 | POST | /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications/.../eap-session |
Baseline and attack logs are in the private evidence bundle:
hallazgos/finding13-ausf-auth-race/evidencia/20260527-195933-race-condition-p2-final/
The final PoC uses a Python client that constructs a protocol-valid synthetic EAP-AKA' response from known vectors. It is not a full UERANSIM/AMF trace, and the P2 run uses a mock UDM returning distinct LEGIT/ATTACK vectors to make the overwrite observable. The synthetic response is sufficient to prove the AUSF state bug because the baseline succeeds with the same client and vectors, while the flood run fails at the exact AT_MAC check predicted by the code.
Impact
The confirmed impact is targeted denial of authentication service for a chosen SUPI.
An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can keep a subscriber from authenticating by continuously overwriting that subscriber's AUSF context. The AUSF process remains running; this is not a process crash and does not expose authentication material to the attacker. The availability impact is on the AUSF's primary security function for the targeted subscriber.
In the default free5GC deployment observed in the lab, the AUSF reported OAuth2 disabled and listened on 0.0.0.0:8100. In a production deployment with strict SBI isolation, mTLS, OAuth2, or firewalling, the attacker would need access to the internal SBA network or control of a network function that can send AUSF authentication requests.
Suggested remediation
The most robust fix is to stop using SUPI as the sole authentication-session key.
Recommended design:
- Generate a unique session identifier for every authentication request.
- Store the
AusfUeContextunder that session identifier. - Return the session identifier in the auth context URL.
- On
/eap-sessionor/5g-aka-confirmation, retrieve the exact session context by session ID rather than by SUPI.
Conceptual example:
sessionID := uuid.New().String()
ausfUeContext := ausf_context.NewAusfUeContext(sessionID)
ausfUeContext.Supi = ueid
// populate context...
ausf_context.AddAusfUeContextToPool(ausfUeContext)
// Return:
// /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications/{sessionID}/eap-session
If the intended behavior is to allow only one active authentication procedure per SUPI, use an atomic check-and-insert operation and reject concurrent attempts explicitly:
if existing, loaded := ausf_context.LoadOrStoreAusfUeContext(ueid, newCtx); loaded {
if existing.AuthStatus == models.AusfUeAuthenticationAuthResult_ONGOING {
c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, models.ProblemDetails{
Status: http.StatusConflict,
Cause: "AUTHENTICATION_IN_PROGRESS",
})
return
}
}
A mutex inside AusfUeContext alone is not sufficient if new requests are still allowed to replace the global map entry for the same SUPI.
Additional hardening:
- Apply per-SUPI rate limiting on
POST /ue-authentications. - Enable and enforce OAuth2/mTLS for SBI access in deployments.
- Add tests for concurrent authentication requests targeting the same SUPI.
Prior art / non-duplication note
Known related issues appear to be different:
- CVE-2026-33063 / GHSA-4jrw-92fg-4jwx affects free5GC AUSF, but concerns a nil interface conversion / DoS in
GetSupiFromSuciSupiMap. It does not cover authentication context overwrite by concurrent requests. - CVE-2026-44318 affects free5GC BSF and concerns a different concurrency issue in a different NF. It does not cover AUSF
UePoolauthentication state keyed by SUPI.