axios
Affected
- introduced
1.0.0, fixed1.15.2(semver)
Fixed versions
1.15.2
Fix
- Fixed version
1.15.2npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-42044
Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver
Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver
Summary
The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses — including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.
The default transformResponse function at lib/defaults/index.js:124 calls JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver), where this is the merged config object. Because parseReviver is not present in Axios defaults, not validated by `assertOptions`, and not subject to any constraints, a polluted Object.prototype.parseReviver function is called for every key-value pair in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.
This is strictly more powerful than the transformResponse gadget because:
Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component: lib/defaults/index.js:124 (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)
CWE
CVSS 3.1
Score: 9.1 (Critical)
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency |
| Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology |
| Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed |
| User Interaction | None | No user interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged | Within the application process |
| Confidentiality | High | The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response — full data exfiltration. In the PoC, apiKey: "sk-secret-internal-key" is captured |
| Integrity | High | Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, isAdmin: false → true, role: "viewer" → "admin", balance: 100 → 999999. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values |
| Availability | None | No crash, no error — the attack is entirely silent |
Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets
| Factor | GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection) | transformResponse | proxy (MITM) | parseReviver (This) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PP target | Object.prototype['header'] | Object.prototype.transformResponse | Object.prototype.proxy | Object.prototype.parseReviver |
| Fixed by 1.15.0? | Yes | No | No | No |
| Constraints | N/A (fixed) | Must return `true` | None | None |
| Data modification | Header injection only | Response replaced with true | Full MITM | Selective per-key modification |
| Stealth | Request anomaly visible | Response becomes true (obvious) | Proxy visible in network | Completely invisible |
| Data access | Headers only | this.auth + raw response | All traffic | Every JSON key-value pair |
| Validated? | N/A | assertOptions validates | Not validated | Not validated |
| In defaults? | N/A | Yes → goes through mergeConfig | No → bypasses mergeConfig | No → bypasses mergeConfig |
Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities
This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.
If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), the polluted parseReviver function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer's code is completely safe — no configuration errors needed.
Root Cause Analysis
The Attack Path
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }
│
▼
mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)
│
│ parseReviver NOT in defaults → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
│ parseReviver NOT in userConfig → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
│ Merged config has NO own parseReviver property
│
▼
transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)
│
│ Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)
│
▼
defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)
│
│ this = config (merged config object, plain {})
│ config.parseReviver → NOT own property → traverses prototype chain
│ → finds Object.prototype.parseReviver → attacker's function!
│
▼
JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair
│
│ Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything
│ No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check
│
▼
Application receives surgically modified JSON response
Why parseReviver Bypasses ALL Existing Protections
lib/defaults/index.js): parseReviver is not defined in the defaults object, so mergeConfig's Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig}) iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own parseReviver property.lib/core/Axios.js:135-142): The schema only contains {baseUrl, withXsrfToken}. parseReviver is not validated.JSON.parse API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that this.parseReviver is intentionally set.transformResponse pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by assertOptions), parseReviver pollution injects into the DEFAULT transformResponse function's JSON.parse call. The default function itself is not replaced, so assertOptions has nothing to catch.Vulnerable Code
File: lib/defaults/index.js, line 124
transformResponse: [
function transformResponse(data) {
// ... transitional checks ...
if (data && utils.isString(data) && ((forcedJSONParsing && !this.responseType) || JSONRequested)) {
// ...
try {
return JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver);
// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
// this = config
// config.parseReviver → prototype chain → attacker's function
} catch (e) {
// ...
}
}
return data;
},
],Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.0.0, fixed 1.15.2 (semver)1.15.2
1.15.2npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0